Experiencing default nudges: autonomy, manipulation, and choice-satisfaction as judged by people themselves

• Published in: Behavioural Public Policy Vol. 8; no. 1; pp. 85 - 106
• Main Authors: Michaelsen, Patrik, Johansson, Lars-Olof, Hedesström, Martin
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 01.01.2024
• Subjects: Blood & organ donations; Decision making; Default; Ethics; Intervention; Perceptions; Psychology; Psychology (Excluding Applied Psychology); Psykologi; Psykologi (Exklusive tillämpad psykologi); choice architecture; autonomy; nudge transparency; default nudge; choice experience
• ISSN: 2398-063X; 2398-0648; 2398-0648
• DOI: 10.1017/bpp.2021.5

Criticisms of nudging suggest that nudges infringe on decision makers’ autonomy. Yet, little empirical research has explored whether people who are subjected to nudges agree. In three between-group experiments ( N = 2083), we subject participants to contrasting choice architectures and measure experiences of autonomy, choice-satisfaction, perceived threat to freedom of choice, and objection to the choice architecture. Participants who received a prosocial opt-out default nudge made more prosocial choices but did not report lower autonomy or choice satisfaction than participants in opt-in default or active-choice conditions. This was the case even when the presence of the nudge was disclosed, and when monetary choice stakes were introduced. With monetary choice stakes, participants perceived the threat to freedom of choice as slightly higher in the nudge condition than in the other conditions, but objection to the choice architecture did not differ between the conditions. Taken together, our results suggest that default nudges are less manipulative and autonomy-infringing than sometimes feared. We recommend that policymakers include measures of choice experiences when testing out new interventions.