Why There is No Us in Consciousness: You Are Simple, a Bodily Soul

You and I are conscious. But , a pair of subjects, cannot be conscious. Why? Because subjects of consciousness cannot have parts but are mereologically simple. Although most contemporary philosophers do not take the thesis that we are simple seriously, David Barnett has proffered an argument in its...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inMetaphysica (Dettelbach, Germany) Vol. 26; no. 1; pp. 155 - 173
Main Author Rickabaugh, Brandon
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published De Gruyter 28.04.2025
Subjects
combination problem
materialism
personal identity
physicalism
substance dualism
unity of consciousness
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ISSN1437-2053
1874-6373
DOI10.1515/mp-2022-0043

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Summary:You and I are conscious. But , a pair of subjects, cannot be conscious. Why? Because subjects of consciousness cannot have parts but are mereologically simple. Although most contemporary philosophers do not take the thesis that we are simple seriously, David Barnett has proffered an argument in its defense that has faced numerous objections but is yet to be defeated, or so I will argue. In responding to these objections, I expand and develop important ontological and mereological theses that strengthen Barnett’s argument and others of its kind. I also argue that a significant body of empirical work supports Barnett’s argument against a recent objection. Lastly, I show how, although not made explicit by Barnett, his argument is plausibly a defense of the immaterial self or a bodily soul.
ISSN:1437-2053
1874-6373
DOI:10.1515/mp-2022-0043