Generic Definitions of ‘Paradox’ and ‘Hypodox’

• Published in: Philosophia (Ramat Gan)
• Main Author: Eldridge-Smith, Peter
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: 23.08.2025
• ISSN: 0048-3893; 1574-9274
• DOI: 10.1007/s11406-025-00892-z

De Morgan says a ‘paradox’ is something which is apart from general opinion, either in subject-matter, method, or conclusion. Such a thing might be a system, theory, opinion, argument, conclusion or some other kind of thing. In this respect, this definition is generic. However, any minority opinion would satisfy this definition. In that respect, it is too broad. Other seminal definitions are more specific. Quine says a ‘paradox’ is a conclusion that sounds absurd yet has an argument to sustain it. Sainsbury likewise defines the paradoxes as a species of conclusions. He says a ‘paradox’ is an apparently unacceptable conclusion of an apparently acceptable argument; whereas Mackie defines a ‘paradox’ as an apparently sound proof of an unacceptable conclusion. Yet others define the paradoxes as a species of statements, arguments, riddles or inconsistent sets of sentences. If the extensions of all these specific definitions are paradoxes, then each of these definitions is too narrow. For an adequate definition, I advocate a generic definition. Besides, many paradoxes have related hypodoxes. For example, Liar paradoxes have related Truth-tellers. Mackie lists Truth-teller counterparts for many paradoxes of self-reference. He characterizes these as consistent variations of paradoxes. Yet if they are consistent, how can they be paradoxes? I generalize Truth-tellers to hypodoxes, which are distinct from paradoxes, including hypodoxes of self-reference, time travel, birthdays and modalities. Accordingly, I also advocate a generic definition of ‘hypodox’.