Topic-sensitivity and the hyperintensionality of knowledge

It is natural to assume that knowledge, like belief, creates a hyperintensional context, that is, that knowledge ascriptions do not allow for substitution of necessarily equivalent prejacents salva veritate . There exist a variety of different proposals for modelling the phenomenon. In the last year...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEpisteme pp. 1 - 14
Main Authors Rossi, Niccolò, Rosenkranz, Sven
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 21.01.2025
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ISSN1742-3600
1750-0117
DOI10.1017/epi.2024.31

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Summary:It is natural to assume that knowledge, like belief, creates a hyperintensional context, that is, that knowledge ascriptions do not allow for substitution of necessarily equivalent prejacents salva veritate . There exist a variety of different proposals for modelling the phenomenon. In the last years, the topic-sensitive approach to the hyperintensionality of knowledge has gained considerable traction. It promises to provide a natural account of why knowledge fails to be closed under necessary equivalence in terms of differences in subject matter. Here, we argue that the topic-sensitive approach, as recently put forward by Franz Berto, Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün, and others, faces formidable problems. The root of these problems lies in the approach’s prediction that a mere grasp of subject matter may help to provide insights into necessary implications that it would seem to require more substantive epistemic work to gain.
ISSN:1742-3600
1750-0117
DOI:10.1017/epi.2024.31