Privacy, defamation and ZXC v Bloomberg

The significance of the Supreme Court decision in ZXC v Bloomberg extends well beyond recognition of the 'starting point' that, up to the point of charge, a person who is subject to police investigation has a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of information about it. The Supreme...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe journal of media law Vol. 14; no. 2; pp. 226 - 237
Main Author Moreham, N. A.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford Routledge 03.07.2022
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
Claimants
Defamation
Human rights
Jurisprudence
misuse of private information
Privacy
reputation
Supreme Court decisions
Tort
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN1757-7632
1757-7640
DOI10.1080/17577632.2022.2139566

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Summary:The significance of the Supreme Court decision in ZXC v Bloomberg extends well beyond recognition of the 'starting point' that, up to the point of charge, a person who is subject to police investigation has a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of information about it. The Supreme Court's willingness to use the privacy tort to protect a claimant's reputational interests (based largely on European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence) moves the misuse of private information action firmly into defamation's domain. This article examines the potential ramifications of the change in relationship between the two actions and shows how measures like the new exception for foreseeable loss of reputation (recognised in ZXC itself) can help preserve essential protections for true, but reputationally-damaging, allegations.
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ISSN:1757-7632
1757-7640
DOI:10.1080/17577632.2022.2139566