II—‘This Is the Bad Case’: What Brains in Vats Can Know

Abstract The orthodox position in epistemology, for both externalists and internalists, is that a subject in a ‘bad case’—a sceptical scenario—is so epistemically badly off that they cannot know how badly off they are. Ofra Magidor (2018) contends that externalists should break ranks on this questio...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inProceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol. 92; no. 1; pp. 183 - 205
Main Author McGlynn, Aidan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford Oxford University Press 01.06.2018
Subjects
Epistemology
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ISSN0309-7013
0066-7374
1467-8349
1467-9264
DOI10.1093/arisup/aky011

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Summary:Abstract The orthodox position in epistemology, for both externalists and internalists, is that a subject in a ‘bad case’—a sceptical scenario—is so epistemically badly off that they cannot know how badly off they are. Ofra Magidor (2018) contends that externalists should break ranks on this question, and that doing so is liberating when it comes time to confront a number of central issues in epistemology, including scepticism and the new evil demon problem for process reliabilism. In this reply, I will question whether Magidor’s argument should persuade externalists, whether it really engages with the orthodox view on what subjects in bad cases can know, and whether the dispute is, as Magidor insists, a significant one for contemporary epistemology.
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ISSN:0309-7013
0066-7374
1467-8349
1467-9264
DOI:10.1093/arisup/aky011