Optimal Coinsurance Strategies in Health Insurance Systems: An Actuarial and Game-Theoretic Analysis

This study develops a structured framework for determining optimal coinsurance rates in a multi-stakeholder health insurance system involving the government, social insurers, private insurers, and individuals. Using an actuarial approach within a Stackelberg game-theoretic model, we address a key ga...

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Published inInternational journal of applied and computational mathematics Vol. 11; no. 6; p. 237
Main Authors Abgarmi, Mohammadreza Barati, Najafabadi, Amir T. Payandeh, Zokaei, Mohammad
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New Delhi Springer India 01.12.2025
Springer Nature B.V
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ISSN2349-5103
2199-5796
DOI10.1007/s40819-025-02054-x

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Summary:This study develops a structured framework for determining optimal coinsurance rates in a multi-stakeholder health insurance system involving the government, social insurers, private insurers, and individuals. Using an actuarial approach within a Stackelberg game-theoretic model, we address a key gap in prior research by jointly optimizing the objectives of all stakeholders rather than focusing on single-agent models. The model shows that without moral hazard and adverse selection, full insurance coverage (i.e., zero out-of-pocket payments) minimizes the mean squared error in premium estimation for private insurers, while complete budget allocation by the government toward healthcare expenses reduces service overutilization. Numerical analyses, based on real-world pharmaceutical cost data, compare coinsurance policies of 0%, 10%, and 20%, revealing that in this case study, lower coinsurance consistently leads to better alignment with optimal insurer strategies. Sensitivity analyses further demonstrate the dominant influence of administrative costs on the optimal loading factor and premium setting.
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ISSN:2349-5103
2199-5796
DOI:10.1007/s40819-025-02054-x