Metaphysics, Mind, and Science: Two Views of Realization

• Published in: Boundaries of the Mind pp. 100 - 119
• Main Author: Wilson, Robert A.
• Format: Book Chapter
• Language: English
• Published: 01.01.2001
• ISBN: 9780521836456; 0521544947; 052183645X; 9780521544948
• DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511606847.006

THE METAPHYSICS OF MIND AND THE FRAGILE SCIENCESIt is commonplace for materialist philosophers of mind to talk of mental states as being realized in states of the brain. So much so, that realization has become part of the very framework in terms of which many conceptualize the metaphysics of mind. However, while the concept of realization has been invoked in the philosophy of mind and psychology for over forty years, it has only recently become the subject of direct philosophical theorizing. Implicit in the literature on the metaphysics of mind is the idea that realization is a general relation, rather than one invoked solely to answer the mind-body problem. In this chapter, I shall argue that making this assumption explicit provides reason to rethink the concept of realization. By the end of this chapter, I hope to have shown how the metaphysical foundations of the cognitive sciences are intertwined with broader meta-physical and methodological issues in other parts of the fragile sciences.Psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists do not, for the most part, talk of realization, but of the neural correlates, or of the neural mechanisms for psychological functions and capacities. Cognitive capacities are localized in states of the brain. It is part of philosophical lore that such talk is loose-speak for the more metaphysically loaded discussions within the philosophy of mind cast in terms of supervenience and realization.