Efficacy of contact tracing for the containment of the 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19)

• Published in: Journal of epidemiology and community health (1979) Vol. 74; no. 10; pp. 861 - 866
• Main Authors: Keeling, Matt J, Hollingsworth, T Deirdre, Read, Jonathan M
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: England BMJ Publishing Group LTD 01.10.2020; BMJ Publishing Group
• Subjects: Betacoronavirus; China; Contact Tracing; Coronaviridae; Coronavirus; Coronavirus Infections - epidemiology; Coronavirus Infections - prevention & control; Coronaviruses; COVID-19; Disease Outbreaks - prevention & control; Disease transmission; Humans; Importation; Imports; Infection Control; Infections; Infectious diseases; Models, Theoretical; Original Research; Outbreaks; Pandemics - prevention & control; Pneumonia, Viral - epidemiology; Pneumonia, Viral - prevention & control; Polls & surveys; Prediction models; Public Health; SARS-CoV-2; China; United Kingdom > UK; communicable diseases; Disease modeling; public health policy; Epidemiology
• ISSN: 0143-005X; 1470-2738; 1470-2738
• DOI: 10.1136/jech-2020-214051

ObjectiveContact tracing is a central public health response to infectious disease outbreaks, especially in the early stages of an outbreak when specific treatments are limited. Importation of novel coronavirus (COVID-19) from China and elsewhere into the UK highlights the need to understand the impact of contact tracing as a control measure.DesignDetailed survey information on social encounters from over 5800 respondents is coupled to predictive models of contact tracing and control. This is used to investigate the likely efficacy of contact tracing and the distribution of secondary cases that may go untraced.ResultsTaking recent estimates for COVID-19 transmission we predict that under effective contact tracing less than 1 in 6 cases will generate any subsequent untraced infections, although this comes at a high logistical burden with an average of 36 individuals traced per case. Changes to the definition of a close contact can reduce this burden, but with increased risk of untraced cases; we find that tracing using a contact definition requiring more than 4 hours of contact is unlikely to control spread.ConclusionsThe current contact tracing strategy within the UK is likely to identify a sufficient proportion of infected individuals such that subsequent spread could be prevented, although the ultimate success will depend on the rapid detection of cases and isolation of contacts. Given the burden of tracing a large number of contacts to find new cases, there is the potential the system could be overwhelmed if imports of infection occur at a rapid rate.