A Cryptographic Perspective on Mitigation vs. Detection in Machine Learning

In this paper, we initiate a cryptographically inspired theoretical study of detection versus mitigation of adversarial inputs produced by attackers on Machine Learning algorithms during inference time. We formally define defense by detection (DbD) and defense by mitigation (DbM). Our definitions co...

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Main Authors Gluch, Greg, Goldwasser, Shafi
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 10.07.2025
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DOI10.48550/arxiv.2504.20310

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Abstract In this paper, we initiate a cryptographically inspired theoretical study of detection versus mitigation of adversarial inputs produced by attackers on Machine Learning algorithms during inference time. We formally define defense by detection (DbD) and defense by mitigation (DbM). Our definitions come in the form of a 3-round protocol between two resource-bounded parties: a trainer/defender and an attacker. The attacker aims to produce inference-time inputs that fool the training algorithm. We define correctness, completeness, and soundness properties to capture successful defense at inference time while not degrading (too much) the performance of the algorithm on inputs from the training distribution. We first show that achieving DbD and achieving DbM are equivalent for ML classification tasks. Surprisingly, this is not the case for ML generative learning tasks, where there are many possible correct outputs for each input. We show a separation between DbD and DbM by exhibiting two generative learning tasks for which it is possible to defend by mitigation but it is provably impossible to defend by detection. The mitigation phase uses significantly less computational resources than the initial training algorithm. In the first learning task we consider sample complexity as the resource and in the second the time complexity. The first result holds under the assumption that the Identity-Based Fully Homomorphic Encryption (IB-FHE), publicly-verifiable zero-knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments of Knowledge (zk-SNARK), and Strongly Unforgeable Signatures exist. The second result assumes the existence of Non-Parallelizing Languages with Average-Case Hardness (NPL) and Incrementally-Verifiable Computation (IVC) and IB-FHE.
AbstractList In this paper, we initiate a cryptographically inspired theoretical study of detection versus mitigation of adversarial inputs produced by attackers on Machine Learning algorithms during inference time. We formally define defense by detection (DbD) and defense by mitigation (DbM). Our definitions come in the form of a 3-round protocol between two resource-bounded parties: a trainer/defender and an attacker. The attacker aims to produce inference-time inputs that fool the training algorithm. We define correctness, completeness, and soundness properties to capture successful defense at inference time while not degrading (too much) the performance of the algorithm on inputs from the training distribution. We first show that achieving DbD and achieving DbM are equivalent for ML classification tasks. Surprisingly, this is not the case for ML generative learning tasks, where there are many possible correct outputs for each input. We show a separation between DbD and DbM by exhibiting two generative learning tasks for which it is possible to defend by mitigation but it is provably impossible to defend by detection. The mitigation phase uses significantly less computational resources than the initial training algorithm. In the first learning task we consider sample complexity as the resource and in the second the time complexity. The first result holds under the assumption that the Identity-Based Fully Homomorphic Encryption (IB-FHE), publicly-verifiable zero-knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments of Knowledge (zk-SNARK), and Strongly Unforgeable Signatures exist. The second result assumes the existence of Non-Parallelizing Languages with Average-Case Hardness (NPL) and Incrementally-Verifiable Computation (IVC) and IB-FHE.
Author Gluch, Greg
Goldwasser, Shafi
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BackLink https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2504.20310$$DView paper in arXiv
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Snippet In this paper, we initiate a cryptographically inspired theoretical study of detection versus mitigation of adversarial inputs produced by attackers on Machine...
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SubjectTerms Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence
Computer Science - Cryptography and Security
Computer Science - Learning
Title A Cryptographic Perspective on Mitigation vs. Detection in Machine Learning
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