Schnorr-Like Identification Scheme Resistant to Malicious Subliminal Setting of Ephemeral Secret

In this paper we propose a modification of the Schnorr IdentificationScheme ( $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ ), which is immune to malicious subliminal setting of ephemeral secret. We introduce a new strong security model in which, during the query stage, we allow the adversary verifier to set random values use...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inInnovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications Vol. 10006; pp. 137 - 148
Main Author Krzywiecki, Łukasz
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published Switzerland Springer International Publishing AG 2016
Springer International Publishing
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text
ISBN9783319472379
3319472372
ISSN0302-9743
1611-3349
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-47238-6_10

Cover

Abstract In this paper we propose a modification of the Schnorr IdentificationScheme ( $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ ), which is immune to malicious subliminal setting of ephemeral secret. We introduce a new strong security model in which, during the query stage, we allow the adversary verifier to set random values used on the prover side in the commitment phase. We define the $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ scheme to be secure if such a setting will not enable the adversary to impersonate the prover later on. Subsequently we prove the security of the modified Schnorr $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ in our strong model. We assume the proposition is important for scenarios in which we do not control the production process of the device on which the scheme is implemented, and where the erroneous pseudo-random number generators make such attacks possible.
AbstractList In this paper we propose a modification of the Schnorr IdentificationScheme ( $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ ), which is immune to malicious subliminal setting of ephemeral secret. We introduce a new strong security model in which, during the query stage, we allow the adversary verifier to set random values used on the prover side in the commitment phase. We define the $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ scheme to be secure if such a setting will not enable the adversary to impersonate the prover later on. Subsequently we prove the security of the modified Schnorr $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ in our strong model. We assume the proposition is important for scenarios in which we do not control the production process of the device on which the scheme is implemented, and where the erroneous pseudo-random number generators make such attacks possible.
Author Krzywiecki, Łukasz
Author_xml – sequence: 1
  givenname: Łukasz
  surname: Krzywiecki
  fullname: Krzywiecki, Łukasz
  email: lukasz.krzywiecki@pwr.wroc.pl
  organization: Faculty of Fundamental Problems of Technology, Department of Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology, Wrocław, Poland
BookMark eNqNkElOAzEQRc0oAuQGLHwBg6f2sESIIVIQEoG1sR03MQntpu3cHydBSOxYVemXXqnqnYLDLnUBgAuCLwnG8kpLhRhiRCMuKVNIGIL3wLjGrIbbTOyDERGEIMa4Pvgzk_oQjDDDFGnJ2TEYaYGFbjCRJ2Cc8wfGtRWESTYCbzO_6NIwoGlcBjiZh67ENnpbYupgnYXPAJ9DjrnYrsCS4KNdRR_TOsPZ2q3iZ-zsCs5CKbF7h6mFt_2GGbahH0I5B0etXeUw_qln4PXu9uXmAU2f7ic311PUU6UKEq3gjmjXcNm2SsyxU5Za5Rz3jtM5oQwrHmzrsCV-ToQj2FpPORfOeqItOwN0tzf3Qz0lDMaltMxVnNkoNdWPYaYaMlt9ZqO0QnwH9UP6WodcTNhQvlqoH_iF7UsYshFUC9lwQ1ilOP8v1jRKYix-sW-Ed4n1
ContentType Book Chapter
Copyright Springer International Publishing AG 2016
Copyright_xml – notice: Springer International Publishing AG 2016
DBID FFUUA
DEWEY 005.8
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-47238-6_10
DatabaseName ProQuest Ebook Central - Book Chapters - Demo use only
DatabaseTitleList
DeliveryMethod fulltext_linktorsrc
Discipline Computer Science
EISBN 9783319472386
3319472380
EISSN 1611-3349
Editor Bica, Ion
Reyhanitabar, Reza
Editor_xml – sequence: 1
  fullname: Bica, Ion
– sequence: 2
  fullname: Reyhanitabar, Reza
EndPage 148
ExternalDocumentID EBC6296754_136_144
EBC5587006_136_144
GroupedDBID 0D6
0DA
38.
AABBV
AAMCO
AAPIT
AAQZU
ABBVZ
ABMNI
ABOWU
ACLMJ
ADCXD
ADPGQ
AEDXK
AEJGN
AEJLV
AEKFX
AETDV
AEZAY
ALMA_UNASSIGNED_HOLDINGS
AORVH
AZZ
BBABE
CZZ
FFUUA
I4C
IEZ
SBO
SWNTM
TPJZQ
TSXQS
Z7R
Z7S
Z7U
Z7X
Z7Y
Z7Z
Z81
Z83
Z84
Z85
Z88
-DT
-GH
-~X
1SB
29L
2HA
2HV
5QI
875
AASHB
ACGFS
AEFIE
EJD
F5P
FEDTE
HVGLF
LAS
LDH
P2P
RNI
RSU
SVGTG
VI1
~02
ID FETCH-LOGICAL-p288t-6f64b19b547ff86d0b8a2a8bb4cb42d123084eafb0a1cd16b10aac2446bac19a3
ISBN 9783319472379
3319472372
ISSN 0302-9743
IngestDate Wed Sep 17 03:55:01 EDT 2025
Thu May 29 00:07:34 EDT 2025
Wed May 28 23:43:11 EDT 2025
IsPeerReviewed true
IsScholarly true
LCCallNum QA76.9.A25QA75.5-76.
Language English
LinkModel OpenURL
MergedId FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-p288t-6f64b19b547ff86d0b8a2a8bb4cb42d123084eafb0a1cd16b10aac2446bac19a3
Notes Partially supported by funding from Polish NCN contract number DEC-2013/09/D/ST6/03927.
Original Abstract: In this paper we propose a modification of the Schnorr IdentificationScheme (\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf {IS}}$$\end{document}), which is immune to malicious subliminal setting of ephemeral secret. We introduce a new strong security model in which, during the query stage, we allow the adversary verifier to set random values used on the prover side in the commitment phase. We define the \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf {IS}}$$\end{document} scheme to be secure if such a setting will not enable the adversary to impersonate the prover later on. Subsequently we prove the security of the modified Schnorr \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf {IS}}$$\end{document} in our strong model. We assume the proposition is important for scenarios in which we do not control the production process of the device on which the scheme is implemented, and where the erroneous pseudo-random number generators make such attacks possible.
OCLC 960695017
PQID EBC5587006_136_144
PageCount 12
ParticipantIDs springer_books_10_1007_978_3_319_47238_6_10
proquest_ebookcentralchapters_6296754_136_144
proquest_ebookcentralchapters_5587006_136_144
PublicationCentury 2000
PublicationDate 2016
PublicationDateYYYYMMDD 2016-01-01
PublicationDate_xml – year: 2016
  text: 2016
PublicationDecade 2010
PublicationPlace Switzerland
PublicationPlace_xml – name: Switzerland
– name: Cham
PublicationSeriesSubtitle Security and Cryptology
PublicationSeriesTitle Lecture Notes in Computer Science
PublicationSeriesTitleAlternate Lect.Notes Computer
PublicationSubtitle 9th International Conference, SECITC 2016, Bucharest, Romania, June 9-10, 2016, Revised Selected Papers
PublicationTitle Innovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications
PublicationYear 2016
Publisher Springer International Publishing AG
Springer International Publishing
Publisher_xml – name: Springer International Publishing AG
– name: Springer International Publishing
RelatedPersons Kleinberg, Jon M.
Mattern, Friedemann
Naor, Moni
Mitchell, John C.
Terzopoulos, Demetri
Steffen, Bernhard
Pandu Rangan, C.
Kanade, Takeo
Kittler, Josef
Weikum, Gerhard
Hutchison, David
Tygar, Doug
RelatedPersons_xml – sequence: 1
  givenname: David
  surname: Hutchison
  fullname: Hutchison, David
  organization: Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom
– sequence: 2
  givenname: Takeo
  surname: Kanade
  fullname: Kanade, Takeo
  organization: Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA
– sequence: 3
  givenname: Josef
  surname: Kittler
  fullname: Kittler, Josef
  organization: University of Surrey, Guildford, United Kingdom
– sequence: 4
  givenname: Jon M.
  surname: Kleinberg
  fullname: Kleinberg, Jon M.
  organization: Cornell University, Ithaca, USA
– sequence: 5
  givenname: Friedemann
  surname: Mattern
  fullname: Mattern, Friedemann
  organization: CNB H 104.2, ETH Zurich, Zürich, Switzerland
– sequence: 6
  givenname: John C.
  surname: Mitchell
  fullname: Mitchell, John C.
  organization: Stanford, USA
– sequence: 7
  givenname: Moni
  surname: Naor
  fullname: Naor, Moni
  organization: Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
– sequence: 8
  givenname: C.
  surname: Pandu Rangan
  fullname: Pandu Rangan, C.
  organization: Madras, Indian Institute of Technology, Chennai, India
– sequence: 9
  givenname: Bernhard
  surname: Steffen
  fullname: Steffen, Bernhard
  organization: Fakultät Informatik, TU Dortmund, Dortmund, Germany
– sequence: 10
  givenname: Demetri
  surname: Terzopoulos
  fullname: Terzopoulos, Demetri
  organization: University of California, Los Angeles, USA
– sequence: 11
  givenname: Doug
  surname: Tygar
  fullname: Tygar, Doug
  organization: University of California, Berkeley, USA
– sequence: 12
  givenname: Gerhard
  surname: Weikum
  fullname: Weikum, Gerhard
  organization: Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbrücken, Germany
SSID ssj0001761373
ssj0002792
Score 1.8591815
Snippet In this paper we propose a modification of the Schnorr IdentificationScheme ( $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ ), which is immune to malicious subliminal setting of...
SourceID springer
proquest
SourceType Publisher
StartPage 137
SubjectTerms Computer security
Data encryption
Deniability
Ephemeral secret leakage
Ephemeral secret setting
Identification scheme
Information retrieval
Simulatability
Title Schnorr-Like Identification Scheme Resistant to Malicious Subliminal Setting of Ephemeral Secret
URI http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/SITE_ID/reader.action?docID=5587006&ppg=144
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/SITE_ID/reader.action?docID=6296754&ppg=144
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-47238-6_10
Volume 10006
hasFullText 1
inHoldings 1
isFullTextHit
isPrint
link http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwnZ3Lb9QwEIctulwQh1IeouUhH7hVRnHiOMmxVAtV1XLZFvVmbMcRCLG77KY98NczEztPrVSVS7SKnMibL7HH4_nNEPIhi2HeyLhmaSoFE6VAsbITrBBWRIl1VSlRnHz5VZ5di_Ob9KZ36Dfqktp8tH936kr-hyqcA66okn0A2e6mcAJ-A184AmE4TozfsZs1hAv6eqZ3LjjNwZzunFxN9GCQGjWEexd6s10w0oVsh-_NAtttNuzi5y937GW8VWiHKTvdbyz0sEWrc1mj4XoJhrxtAmkX6NHyNcIWrgunnq9_eA0y9nIT5NbBzcCnbobWzThxVA58ZSdfRkvTBL5tkcWJLxXTjbU4Pe4cuYfBGiiswmtzJlUIeh0lyuY-ZeQkUfb806mMC1gACcUTuBAarf8wrC-G-_Ch2Moe2YO-zcjjk_n5xbfeG5eBWZNh0Y-u37FPz9T_j4Hwclc3R0uUya56Y6xcPSNPUcBCUVkCHT8gj9zyOdlvy3fQMJq_IN-HqOkYNfWoaYea1ivaoaY9ahpQ01VFO9TUo35Jrj_Pr07PWCi4wdZxntdMVlIYXphUZFWVyzIyuY51boywRsQlGDlRLpyuTKS5Lbk0PNLagoEojba80MkrMluulu41obExzuUCFqSmEEZnpuBVnNsqFUCoTM0hYe3TUk1YQIhFtv7ZbFWawkwSyRblve0n6A_JcYtAYfOtavNzAzuVKGCnGnYK2R098O5vyJP-G3lLZvXm1r0D47Q278Ob9Q9_XpHv
linkProvider Library Specific Holdings
openUrl ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=bookitem&rft.title=Innovative+Security+Solutions+for+Information+Technology+and+Communications&rft.atitle=Schnorr-Like+Identification+Scheme+Resistant+to+Malicious+Subliminal+Setting+of+Ephemeral+Secret&rft.date=2016-01-01&rft.pub=Springer+International+Publishing+AG&rft.isbn=9783319472379&rft.volume=10006&rft_id=info:doi/10.1007%2F978-3-319-47238-6_10&rft.externalDBID=144&rft.externalDocID=EBC6296754_136_144
thumbnail_s http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/image/custom?url=https%3A%2F%2Febookcentral.proquest.com%2Fcovers%2F5587006-l.jpg
http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/image/custom?url=https%3A%2F%2Febookcentral.proquest.com%2Fcovers%2F6296754-l.jpg