Schnorr-Like Identification Scheme Resistant to Malicious Subliminal Setting of Ephemeral Secret
In this paper we propose a modification of the Schnorr IdentificationScheme ( $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ ), which is immune to malicious subliminal setting of ephemeral secret. We introduce a new strong security model in which, during the query stage, we allow the adversary verifier to set random values use...
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| Published in | Innovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications Vol. 10006; pp. 137 - 148 |
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| Main Author | |
| Format | Book Chapter |
| Language | English |
| Published |
Switzerland
Springer International Publishing AG
2016
Springer International Publishing |
| Series | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
| ISBN | 9783319472379 3319472372 |
| ISSN | 0302-9743 1611-3349 |
| DOI | 10.1007/978-3-319-47238-6_10 |
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| Abstract | In this paper we propose a modification of the Schnorr IdentificationScheme ( $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ ), which is immune to malicious subliminal setting of ephemeral secret. We introduce a new strong security model in which, during the query stage, we allow the adversary verifier to set random values used on the prover side in the commitment phase. We define the $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ scheme to be secure if such a setting will not enable the adversary to impersonate the prover later on. Subsequently we prove the security of the modified Schnorr $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ in our strong model. We assume the proposition is important for scenarios in which we do not control the production process of the device on which the scheme is implemented, and where the erroneous pseudo-random number generators make such attacks possible. |
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| AbstractList | In this paper we propose a modification of the Schnorr IdentificationScheme ( $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ ), which is immune to malicious subliminal setting of ephemeral secret. We introduce a new strong security model in which, during the query stage, we allow the adversary verifier to set random values used on the prover side in the commitment phase. We define the $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ scheme to be secure if such a setting will not enable the adversary to impersonate the prover later on. Subsequently we prove the security of the modified Schnorr $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ in our strong model. We assume the proposition is important for scenarios in which we do not control the production process of the device on which the scheme is implemented, and where the erroneous pseudo-random number generators make such attacks possible. |
| Author | Krzywiecki, Łukasz |
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| Copyright | Springer International Publishing AG 2016 |
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| DOI | 10.1007/978-3-319-47238-6_10 |
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| Discipline | Computer Science |
| EISBN | 9783319472386 3319472380 |
| EISSN | 1611-3349 |
| Editor | Bica, Ion Reyhanitabar, Reza |
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| EndPage | 148 |
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| Notes | Partially supported by funding from Polish NCN contract number DEC-2013/09/D/ST6/03927. Original Abstract: In this paper we propose a modification of the Schnorr IdentificationScheme (\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf {IS}}$$\end{document}), which is immune to malicious subliminal setting of ephemeral secret. We introduce a new strong security model in which, during the query stage, we allow the adversary verifier to set random values used on the prover side in the commitment phase. We define the \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf {IS}}$$\end{document} scheme to be secure if such a setting will not enable the adversary to impersonate the prover later on. Subsequently we prove the security of the modified Schnorr \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathsf {IS}}$$\end{document} in our strong model. We assume the proposition is important for scenarios in which we do not control the production process of the device on which the scheme is implemented, and where the erroneous pseudo-random number generators make such attacks possible. |
| OCLC | 960695017 |
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| PublicationSeriesSubtitle | Security and Cryptology |
| PublicationSeriesTitle | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
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| PublicationSubtitle | 9th International Conference, SECITC 2016, Bucharest, Romania, June 9-10, 2016, Revised Selected Papers |
| PublicationTitle | Innovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications |
| PublicationYear | 2016 |
| Publisher | Springer International Publishing AG Springer International Publishing |
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| RelatedPersons | Kleinberg, Jon M. Mattern, Friedemann Naor, Moni Mitchell, John C. Terzopoulos, Demetri Steffen, Bernhard Pandu Rangan, C. Kanade, Takeo Kittler, Josef Weikum, Gerhard Hutchison, David Tygar, Doug |
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| Snippet | In this paper we propose a modification of the Schnorr IdentificationScheme ( $${\mathsf {IS}}$$ ), which is immune to malicious subliminal setting of... |
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| StartPage | 137 |
| SubjectTerms | Computer security Data encryption Deniability Ephemeral secret leakage Ephemeral secret setting Identification scheme Information retrieval Simulatability |
| Title | Schnorr-Like Identification Scheme Resistant to Malicious Subliminal Setting of Ephemeral Secret |
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