Augmented Random Oracles

We propose a new paradigm for justifying the security of random oracle-based protocols, which we call the Augmented Random Oracle Model (AROM). We show that the AROM captures a wide range of important random oracle impossibility results. Thus a proof in the AROM implies some resiliency to such impos...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAdvances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2022 Vol. 13509; pp. 35 - 65
Main Author Zhandry, Mark
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published Switzerland Springer 2022
Springer Nature Switzerland
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
Online AccessGet full text
ISBN9783031159817
3031159810
ISSN0302-9743
1611-3349
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-15982-4_2

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Summary:We propose a new paradigm for justifying the security of random oracle-based protocols, which we call the Augmented Random Oracle Model (AROM). We show that the AROM captures a wide range of important random oracle impossibility results. Thus a proof in the AROM implies some resiliency to such impossibilities. We then consider three ROM transforms which are subject to impossibilities: Fiat-Shamir (FS), Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO), and Encrypt-with-Hash (EwH). We show in each case how to obtain security in the AROM by strengthening the building blocks or modifying the transform. Along the way, we give a couple other results. We improve the assumptions needed for the FO and EwH impossibilities from indistinguishability obfuscation to circularly secure LWE; we argue that our AROM still captures this improved impossibility. We also demonstrate that there is no “best possible” hash function, by giving a pair of security properties, both of which can be instantiated in the standard model separately, which cannot be simultaneously satisfied by a single hash function.
ISBN:9783031159817
3031159810
ISSN:0302-9743
1611-3349
DOI:10.1007/978-3-031-15982-4_2