Optimal Biosecurity Policy with Heterogeneous Farmers

Infectious animal diseases raise serious challenges for both public health and the livestock sector. We develop an original principal Ðmultiple agent model for preventing these diseases that explicitly considers the heterogeneity of risk-averse farmers in addition to production externalities and ex...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of agricultural and resource economics Vol. 47; no. 2; pp. 355 - 372
Main Authors Osseni, Abdel Fawaz, Gohin, Alexandre, Rault, Arnaud
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 01.05.2022
Edition1835
Subjects
Agricultural and Food Policy
animals
biosecurity
Farm Management
issues and policy
livestock and meat industry
public health
Risk and Uncertainty
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ISSN1068-5502
2327-8285
DOI10.22004/ag.econ.311029

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Summary:Infectious animal diseases raise serious challenges for both public health and the livestock sector. We develop an original principal Ðmultiple agent model for preventing these diseases that explicitly considers the heterogeneity of risk-averse farmers in addition to production externalities and ex ante informational asymmetries. Our results confirm that failing to consider farmersÕ heterogeneity generates Pareto-inefficient solutions. When using individual-based instruments, the government should cope with heterogeneity by increasing guaranteed payments and reducing average payments. However, when population-based instruments are the only available policy tools, increasing average payments is better for reducing moral hazard issues.
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ISSN:1068-5502
2327-8285
DOI:10.22004/ag.econ.311029