Command in Twenty-First Century Counterinsurgency

This article examines the challenges of command in counterinsurgency through the British experience in Basra, Iraq (2006–2007). It argues that command is shaped less by individual leaders than by structural and temporal constraints inherent in the strategic culture of liberal states. Using a qualita...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inRevista científica "General José María Córdova." Vol. 23; no. 51
Main Author Warren Anthony Chin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Escuela Militar de Cadetes “General José María Córdova” 01.08.2025
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ISSN1900-6586
2500-7645
DOI10.21830/19006586.1556

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Summary:This article examines the challenges of command in counterinsurgency through the British experience in Basra, Iraq (2006–2007). It argues that command is shaped less by individual leaders than by structural and temporal constraints inherent in the strategic culture of liberal states. Using a qualitative case study and the conceptual lenses of “wartime” and “high modern utopianism,” the paper analyses command during Operation Sinbad. The analysis finds that a temporal paradox—pitting the long-term requirements of insurgency against short-term political timelines—fundamentally undermined the mission. This contradiction led to resource shortfalls and institutional fragmentation that crippled the “comprehensive approach”. The paper concludes that tactical actions, however skilful, cannot overcome the institutional pathologies defining how Western states prosecute such wars.
ISSN:1900-6586
2500-7645
DOI:10.21830/19006586.1556