捕捞限额制度下主体行为的博弈分析

为从根本上解决我国渔业资源急剧衰退的问题,渔业捕捞限额制度的实施迫在眉睫;该制度的本质是对人和船进行管理,各主体不同策略的选择对其实施效果产生直接影响。文章从捕捞限额制度实施的监管层面出发,构建三方静态博弈模型,研究渔业生产者、渔业监管者和其他渔业生产者的博弈规律;提出应尽快构建监管体系并在实施初期放宽对政府疏于监管的惩罚,建立高额举报奖励机制,设立合理罚款额度等建议,以期为我国渔业捕捞限额制度的推进和现代渔业综合试验改革提供参考。...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in海洋开发与管理 Vol. 34; no. 4; pp. 98 - 104
Main Author 陆佼 杨正勇
Format Journal Article
LanguageChinese
Published 海洋出版社有限公司 28.04.2017
海洋产业发展战略研究中心 上海201306
上海海洋大学经济管理学院 上海201306%上海海洋大学经济管理学院 上海201306
中国水产养殖经济研究中心 上海201306
Subjects
渔业捕捞限额制度
渔业生产者
渔业资源
静态博弈
静态博弈
渔业生产者
渔业资源
渔业捕捞限额制度
Static game
Fishery producers
Fishing quota system
Fishery resources
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ISSN1005-9857

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Summary:为从根本上解决我国渔业资源急剧衰退的问题,渔业捕捞限额制度的实施迫在眉睫;该制度的本质是对人和船进行管理,各主体不同策略的选择对其实施效果产生直接影响。文章从捕捞限额制度实施的监管层面出发,构建三方静态博弈模型,研究渔业生产者、渔业监管者和其他渔业生产者的博弈规律;提出应尽快构建监管体系并在实施初期放宽对政府疏于监管的惩罚,建立高额举报奖励机制,设立合理罚款额度等建议,以期为我国渔业捕捞限额制度的推进和现代渔业综合试验改革提供参考。
Bibliography:In order to fundamentally solve the deterioration of fishery resources,it＇s urgent to implement the fishing quota system.The nature of this system is management of people and ships. The paper focused on the supervision level of fishing quota models to study the game rules of fishery producers,fishery reg ers.Suggestions on building regulation system as soon as possib the lack of government＇s supervision in the beginning stage,esta ators and other fishery produc , lightening ishing high the punishment for public reporting re wards and setting up reasonable penalty system to provide the guide for the fishing quota system and modern fishery comprehensive test reform in China were also provided.
Fishing quota system, Static game, Fishery producers,Fishery resources
LU Jiao1 , YANG Zhengyong1,2,3 （1. College of Economics and Management, ShangHai Ocean University, Shanghai 201306, China 2. China Aquaculture Economic Research Center, Shanghai 201306, China ; 3. Marine Industry Develop ment Strategy Research Center,Sha
ISSN:1005-9857