Designing Incentive Systems for Truthful Forecast Information Sharing Within a Firm

We consider a firm where the sales division ( Sales ) is responsible for demand forecasting and the operations division ( Operations ) is responsible for ordering. Sales has better information about the demand than Operations and sends a nonbinding demand forecast to Operations . To incentivize trut...

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Published inManagement science Vol. 64; no. 8; pp. 3690 - 3713
Main Authors Scheele, Lisa M., Thonemann, Ulrich W., Slikker, Marco
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Linthicum INFORMS 01.08.2018
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
Subjects
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ISSN0025-1909
1526-5501
DOI10.1287/mnsc.2017.2805

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Abstract We consider a firm where the sales division ( Sales ) is responsible for demand forecasting and the operations division ( Operations ) is responsible for ordering. Sales has better information about the demand than Operations and sends a nonbinding demand forecast to Operations . To incentivize truthful information sharing, we include a forecast error penalty in the incentive system of Sales . Besides monetary payoffs, we also add behavioral factors to the utility function of Sales . We model the setting as a signaling game and derive the Pareto-dominant separating equilibria of the game. In laboratory experiments, we observe human behavior that is in line with the predictions of the behavioral model but deviates substantially from expected-payoff-maximizing behavior. We use the behavioral model to design incentive systems for truthful information sharing and validate the approach in an experiment with out-of-sample treatments and out-of-sample subjects. We conduct additional experiments to provide further robustness to the results. The experimental data and e-companion are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2805 . This paper was accepted by Martin Lariviere, operations management.
AbstractList We consider a firm where the sales division (SALES) is responsible for demand forecasting and the operations division (OPERATIONS) is responsible for ordering. Sales has better information about the demand than Operations and sends a nonbinding demand forecast to OPERATIONS. To incentivize truthful information sharing, we include a forecast error penalty in the incentive system of SALES. Besides monetary payoffs, we also add behavioral factors to the utility function of SALES. We model the setting as a signaling game and derive the Pareto-dominant separating equilibria of the game. In laboratory experiments, we observe human behavior that is in line with the predictions of the behavioral model but deviates substantially from expected-payoff-maximizing behavior. We use the behavioral model to design incentive systems for truthful information sharing and validate the approach in an experiment with out-of-sample treatments and out-of-sample subjects. We conduct additional experiments to provide further robustness to the results.
We consider a firm where the sales division (Sales) is responsible for demand forecasting and the operations division (Operations) is responsible for ordering. Sales has better information about the demand than Operations and sends a nonbinding demand forecast to Operations. To incentivize truthful information sharing, we include a forecast error penalty in the incentive system of Sales. Besides monetary payoffs, we also add behavioral factors to the utility function of Sales. We model the setting as a signaling game and derive the Pareto-dominant separating equilibria of the game. In laboratory experiments, we observe human behavior that is in line with the predictions of the behavioral model but deviates substantially from expected-payoff-maximizing behavior. We use the behavioral model to design incentive systems for truthful information sharing and validate the approach in an experiment with out-of-sample treatments and out-of-sample subjects. We conduct additional experiments to provide further robustness to the results. The experimental data and e-companion are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2805 . This paper was accepted by Martin Lariviere, operations management.
We consider a firm where the sales division ( Sales ) is responsible for demand forecasting and the operations division ( Operations ) is responsible for ordering. Sales has better information about the demand than Operations and sends a nonbinding demand forecast to Operations . To incentivize truthful information sharing, we include a forecast error penalty in the incentive system of Sales . Besides monetary payoffs, we also add behavioral factors to the utility function of Sales . We model the setting as a signaling game and derive the Pareto-dominant separating equilibria of the game. In laboratory experiments, we observe human behavior that is in line with the predictions of the behavioral model but deviates substantially from expected-payoff-maximizing behavior. We use the behavioral model to design incentive systems for truthful information sharing and validate the approach in an experiment with out-of-sample treatments and out-of-sample subjects. We conduct additional experiments to provide further robustness to the results. The experimental data and e-companion are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2805 . This paper was accepted by Martin Lariviere, operations management.
We consider a firm where the sales division (SALES) is responsible for demand forecasting and the operations division (OPERATIONS) is responsible for ordering. Sales has better information about the demand than Operations and sends a nonbinding demand forecast to OPERATIONS. To incentivize truthful information sharing, we include a forecast error penalty in the incentive system of SALES. Besides monetary payoffs, we also add behavioral factors to the utility function of SALES. We model the setting as a signaling game and derive the Pareto-dominant separating equilibria of the game. In laboratory experiments, we observe human behavior that is in line with the predictions of the behavioral model but deviates substantially from expected-payoff-maximizing behavior. We use the behavioral model to design incentive systems for truthful information sharing and validate the approach in an experiment with out-of-sample treatments and out-of-sample subjects. We conduct additional experiments to provide further robustness to the results. History: Accepted by Martin Lariviere, operations management. Funding: The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the DFG Research Group "Design and Behavior" [FOR 1371]. Supplemental Material: The experimental data and e-companion are available at Keywords: behavioral operations * experimental economics * asymmetric forecast information * information sharing * sales incentives * forecast error * signaling
Audience Trade
Academic
Author Thonemann, Ulrich W.
Scheele, Lisa M.
Slikker, Marco
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Snippet We consider a firm where the sales division ( Sales ) is responsible for demand forecasting and the operations division ( Operations ) is responsible for...
We consider a firm where the sales division (Sales) is responsible for demand forecasting and the operations division (Operations) is responsible for ordering....
We consider a firm where the sales division (SALES) is responsible for demand forecasting and the operations division (OPERATIONS) is responsible for ordering....
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SubjectTerms Analysis
asymmetric forecast information
behavioral operations
Demand
Employee incentives
experimental economics
forecast error
Forecasts and trends
Human acts
Human behavior
Incentives
Information behavior
Information sharing
Management science
Observations
Planning
sales incentives
signaling
Title Designing Incentive Systems for Truthful Forecast Information Sharing Within a Firm
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