基于主从博弈的具有多类型产消者的微电网电力交易动态定价策略

为实现微电网系统中“风、光、储”能源互补运行,同时激励3类能源产消者积极参与电力交易,本文构建微电网调度中心与三类产消者之间的主从博弈模型。在模型中,作为领导者的微电网调度中心决策各时段购售电价,作为跟随者的产消者根据购售电价向调度中心发送各自用电需求,调度中心再根据收到的用电需求调整购售电价,最终达到博弈均衡。本文拓展了文献中以微电网单边决策为主的电力交易模型,并在各博弈主体作为独立理性参与决策情境下,证明主从博弈模型均衡解的存在性和唯一性。本文开发基于差分进化的均衡解求解算法,并通过数值实验验证模型和算法的有效性。研究结果为微电网调度中心购售电价的制定提供科学依据,促进了分布式可再生能源高...

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Published in工业工程 Vol. 27; no. 5; pp. 138 - 149
Main Authors 刘继文, 侯强, 晏鹏宇
Format Journal Article
LanguageChinese
Published 广东工业大学 01.10.2024
电子科技大学 经济与管理学院,四川 成都 611731%沈阳工业大学 管理学院,辽宁 沈阳 110870
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ISSN1007-7375
DOI10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.230239

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Abstract 为实现微电网系统中“风、光、储”能源互补运行,同时激励3类能源产消者积极参与电力交易,本文构建微电网调度中心与三类产消者之间的主从博弈模型。在模型中,作为领导者的微电网调度中心决策各时段购售电价,作为跟随者的产消者根据购售电价向调度中心发送各自用电需求,调度中心再根据收到的用电需求调整购售电价,最终达到博弈均衡。本文拓展了文献中以微电网单边决策为主的电力交易模型,并在各博弈主体作为独立理性参与决策情境下,证明主从博弈模型均衡解的存在性和唯一性。本文开发基于差分进化的均衡解求解算法,并通过数值实验验证模型和算法的有效性。研究结果为微电网调度中心购售电价的制定提供科学依据,促进了分布式可再生能源高效利用。
AbstractList F407.61%C93; 为实现微电网系统中"风、光、储"能源互补运行,同时激励 3类能源产消者积极参与电力交易,本文构建微电网调度中心与三类产消者之间的主从博弈模型.在模型中,作为领导者的微电网调度中心决策各时段购售电价,作为跟随者的产消者根据购售电价向调度中心发送各自用电需求,调度中心再根据收到的用电需求调整购售电价,最终达到博弈均衡.本文拓展了文献中以微电网单边决策为主的电力交易模型,并在各博弈主体作为独立理性参与决策情境下,证明主从博弈模型均衡解的存在性和唯一性.本文开发基于差分进化的均衡解求解算法,并通过数值实验验证模型和算法的有效性.研究结果为微电网调度中心购售电价的制定提供科学依据,促进了分布式可再生能源高效利用.
为实现微电网系统中“风、光、储”能源互补运行,同时激励3类能源产消者积极参与电力交易,本文构建微电网调度中心与三类产消者之间的主从博弈模型。在模型中,作为领导者的微电网调度中心决策各时段购售电价,作为跟随者的产消者根据购售电价向调度中心发送各自用电需求,调度中心再根据收到的用电需求调整购售电价,最终达到博弈均衡。本文拓展了文献中以微电网单边决策为主的电力交易模型,并在各博弈主体作为独立理性参与决策情境下,证明主从博弈模型均衡解的存在性和唯一性。本文开发基于差分进化的均衡解求解算法,并通过数值实验验证模型和算法的有效性。研究结果为微电网调度中心购售电价的制定提供科学依据,促进了分布式可再生能源高效利用。
Abstract_FL In order to realize the complementary operation of"wind,photovoltaic and energy storage"sources in microgrid systems,and simultaneously to inspire the three types of energy prosumers to actively participate in power trading,this paper establishes a Stackelberg game model between the microgrid scheduling center and the three types of prosumers.In the model,as the leader,the microgrid scheduling center determines the purchase and sale prices for each time period,As followers,the prosumers send their respective electricity demand to the scheduling center according to these prices.Then,the scheduling center adjusts the purchase and sale prices based on the received electricity demand,ultimately achieving a game equilibrium.This paper extends the power trading models in the existing literature primarily focused on unilateral decision-making in microgrids,and proves the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg game model in the situation that each game participate makes independent rational decision.This paper also develops an equilibrium solution algorithm based on differential evolution,and verifies the effectiveness of the model and algorithm through numerical experiments.The results of this paper provide a scientific basis for setting the purchase and sale prices of electricity by microgrid scheduling centers,which promotes the efficient utilization of distributed renewable energy.
Author 晏鹏宇
侯强
刘继文
AuthorAffiliation 电子科技大学 经济与管理学院,四川 成都 611731%沈阳工业大学 管理学院,辽宁 沈阳 110870
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Author_FL YAN Pengyu
LIU Jiwen
HOU Qiang
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DocumentTitle_FL Dynamic Pricing Strategy for Microgrid Power Trading with Multiple Types of Prosumers Based on Stackelberg Game
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Issue 5
Keywords 产消者
主从博弈
需求响应
微电网
prosumers
Stackelberg game
microgrid
demand response
Language Chinese
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PublicationTitle 工业工程
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Publisher 广东工业大学
电子科技大学 经济与管理学院,四川 成都 611731%沈阳工业大学 管理学院,辽宁 沈阳 110870
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Snippet 为实现微电网系统中“风、光、储”能源互补运行,同时激励3类能源产消者积极参与电力交易,本文构建微电网调度中心与三类产消者之间的主从博弈模型。在模型中,作为领导者的微...
F407.61%C93; 为实现微电网系统中"风、光、储"能源互补运行,同时激励 3类能源产消者积极参与电力交易,本文构建微电网调度中心与三类产消者之间的主从博弈模型.在模型中,作为...
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Title 基于主从博弈的具有多类型产消者的微电网电力交易动态定价策略
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