Tiered Housing Allocation with Preannounced Rankings: An Experimental Analysis
We study in the laboratory a variant of the house allocation with existing tenants problem where subjects are partitioned into tiers with hierarchical privileges, and they know their position in the priority queue before making their decision. We evaluate the performance of the modified versions of...
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| Published in | Journal of economics & management strategy Vol. 25; no. 1; pp. 133 - 160 |
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| Main Authors | , |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
| Published |
Cambridge
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
01.03.2016
Blackwell Wiley Subscription Services, Inc |
| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
| ISSN | 1058-6407 1530-9134 |
| DOI | 10.1111/jems.12143 |
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| Abstract | We study in the laboratory a variant of the house allocation with existing tenants problem where subjects are partitioned into tiers with hierarchical privileges, and they know their position in the priority queue before making their decision. We evaluate the performance of the modified versions of three well‐known mechanisms: Top Trading Cycle (TTC), Gale‐Shapley, and Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) with Squatting Rights. For all three mechanisms, we find low rates of participation (around 40%), high rates of truth‐telling conditional on participation (around 90%), high proportions of fair allocations (above 90%), and significant efficiency losses. We also observe differences across mechanisms: RSD is ranked highest in efficiency and TTC is ranked lowest in fairness. We then show that position in the queue has a positive and significant impact on participation whereas tier has little effect on behavior. Finally, the individual analysis reveals that the majority of subjects who do not play according to the theory still follow discernible patterns of participation and preference revelation. |
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| AbstractList | We study in the laboratory a variant of the house allocation with existing tenants problem where subjects are partitioned into tiers with hierarchical privileges, and they know their position in the priority queue before making their decision. We evaluate the performance of the modified versions of three well‐known mechanisms: Top Trading Cycle (TTC), Gale‐Shapley, and Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) with Squatting Rights. For all three mechanisms, we find low rates of participation (around 40%), high rates of truth‐telling conditional on participation (around 90%), high proportions of fair allocations (above 90%), and significant efficiency losses. We also observe differences across mechanisms: RSD is ranked highest in efficiency and TTC is ranked lowest in fairness. We then show that position in the queue has a positive and significant impact on participation whereas tier has little effect on behavior. Finally, the individual analysis reveals that the majority of subjects who do not play according to the theory still follow discernible patterns of participation and preference revelation. We study in the laboratory a variant of the house allocation with existing tenants problem where subjects are partitioned into tiers with hierarchical privileges, and they know their position in the priority queue before making their decision. We evaluate the performance of the modified versions of three well-known mechanisms: Top Trading Cycle (TTC), Gale-Shapley, and Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) with Squatting Rights. For all three mechanisms, we find low rates of participation (around 40%), high rates of truth-telling conditional on participation (around 90%), high proportions of fair allocations (above 90%), and significant efficiency losses. We also observe differences across mechanisms: RSD is ranked highest in efficiency and TTC is ranked lowest in fairness. We then show that position in the queue has a positive and significant impact on participation whereas tier has little effect on behavior. Finally, the individual analysis reveals that the majority of subjects who do not play according to the theory still follow discernible patterns of participation and preference revelation. Reprinted by permission of the MIT Press We study in the laboratory a variant of the house allocation with existing tenants problem where subjects are partitioned into tiers with hierarchical privileges, and they know their position in the priority queue before making their decision. We evaluate the performance of the modified versions of three well-known mechanisms: Top Trading Cycle (TTC), Gale-Shapley, and Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) with Squatting Rights. For all three mechanisms, we find low rates of participation (around 40%), high rates of truth-telling conditional on participation (around 90%), high proportions of fair allocations (above 90%), and significant efficiency losses. We also observe differences across mechanisms: RSD is ranked highest in efficiency and TTC is ranked lowest in fairness. We then show that position in the queue has a positive and significant impact on participation whereas tier has little effect on behavior. Finally, the individual analysis reveals that the majority of subjects who do not play according to the theory still follow discernible patterns of participation and preference revelation. [web URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jems.12143/abstract] |
| Author | Singhal, Saurabh Carrillo, Juan D. |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Juan D. surname: Carrillo fullname: Carrillo, Juan D. email: juandc@usc.edu organization: Department of Economics, University of Southern California Los Angeles, CA 90089 and CEPR – sequence: 2 givenname: Saurabh surname: Singhal fullname: Singhal, Saurabh email: saurabh@wider.unu.edu organization: UNU WIDER |
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| Notes | Appendix C: Sample of Instructions (tTTC mechanism) istex:1709036045D24F19A01D017B9708F21A59596C3A ArticleID:JEMS12143 ark:/67375/WNG-X9G7NM35-K We thank Ricardo Alonso, Manuel Castro, Arya Gaduh, Brijesh Pinto, Smriti Sharma, and the audience at various seminars for helpful comments, and Chris Crabbe for developing the software. We thank the LUSK center for Real Estate and the Microsoft Corporation for financial support. Juan D. Carrrillo also gratefully acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation, grant SES 1425062. All remaining errors are our own. SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 |
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| References | Nalbantian, H.R., and A. Schotter, 1995, "Matching and Efficiency in the Baseball Free-Agent System: An Experimental Examination," Journal of Labor Economics, 13, 1-31. Pápai, S., 2000, "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, 68, 1403-1433. Kurino, M., 2014, "House Allocation with Overlapping Generations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6, 258-289. Mullin, C.H., and D.H. Reiley, 2006, "Recombinant Estimation for Normal-Form Games with Applications to Auctions and Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, 54, 159-182. Roth, A.E., T. Sönmez, and M.U. Ünver, 2004, "Kidney Exchange," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 457-488. Abdulkadiroğlu, A. and T. Sönmez, 2003, "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, 93, 729-747. Klijn, F., J. Pais, and M. Vorsatz, 2013, "Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment," Experimental Economics, 16, 1-22. Calsamiglia, C., G. Haeringer, and F. Klijn, 2010, "Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, 100, 1860-1874. Guillen, P., and O. Kesten, 2012, "Matching Markets with Mixed Ownership: The Case for A Real-life Assignment Mechanism," International Economic Review, 53, 1027-1046. Pais, J., A. Pintér, and R.F. Veszteg, 2011, "College Admissions and the Role of Information: An Experimental Study," International Economic Review, 52, 713-737. Chen, Y., and T. Sönmez, 2006, "School Choice: An Experimental Study," Journal of Economic Theory, 127, 202-231. Olson, M., and D. Porter, 1994, "An Experimental Examination into the Design of Decentralized Methods to Solve the Assignment Problem with and without Money," Economic Theory, 4, 11-40. Kagel, J., and A. Roth, 2000, "The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 201-235. Shapley, L., and H. Scarf, 1974, "On Cores and Indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, 23-28. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., P. Pathak, A. Roth, and T. Sönmez, 2005b, "The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, 95, 368-371. Gale, D., and L. Shapley, 1962, "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9-15. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., P. Pathak, and A. Roth, 2005a, "The New York High School Match," American Economic Review, 95, 364-367. Baccara, M., A. Imrohoroglu, A. Wilson, and L. Yariv, 2012, "A Field Study on Matching with Network Externalities," American Economic Review, 102, 1773-1804. Haruvy, E., A. Roth, and M.U. Ünver, 2006, "The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 30, 457-486. Pais, J., and A. Pintér, 2008, "School Choice and Information: An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, 64, 303-328. Ünver, M.U., 2005, "On the Survival of Some Unstable Two-Sided Matching Mechanisms," International Journal of Game Theory, 33, 239-254. Chen, Y., and T. Sönmez, 2004, "An Experimental Study of House Allocation Mechanisms," Economics Letters, 83, 137-140. Krishna, A. and M.U. Ünver, 2008, "Improving the Efficiency of Course Bidding at Business Schools: Field and Laboratory Studies," Marketing Science 27, 262-282. Roth, A.E., T. Sönmez, and M.U. Ünver,2005, "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, 125, 151-188. Abdulkadiroğlu, A. and T. Sönmez, 1999, "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, 88, 233-260. Chen, Y., and T. Sönmez, 2002, "Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, 92, 1669-1686. Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor, 1990, Two-Sided Matching: A Study on Game - Theoretic Modelling, Cambridge University Press Cambridge. 2004; 83 2006; 30 2012; 102 2011 2000; 115 2006; 54 2000; 68 1995; 13 1998 2010; 100 2011; 52 2005b; 95 1999; 88 1974; 1 2003; 93 2014; 85 2012; 53 2013; 16 1990 2005; 125 2008; 27 1962; 69 2002; 92 2015 2013 2008; 64 2006; 127 2004; 119 2005a; 95 2014; 6 2005; 33 1994; 4 e_1_2_10_23_1 e_1_2_10_24_1 e_1_2_10_21_1 e_1_2_10_22_1 e_1_2_10_20_1 e_1_2_10_2_1 e_1_2_10_4_1 e_1_2_10_18_1 e_1_2_10_3_1 e_1_2_10_19_1 e_1_2_10_6_1 e_1_2_10_16_1 e_1_2_10_5_1 e_1_2_10_17_1 e_1_2_10_8_1 e_1_2_10_14_1 e_1_2_10_7_1 e_1_2_10_15_1 e_1_2_10_12_1 e_1_2_10_9_1 e_1_2_10_13_1 e_1_2_10_34_1 e_1_2_10_10_1 e_1_2_10_33_1 e_1_2_10_11_1 e_1_2_10_32_1 e_1_2_10_31_1 e_1_2_10_30_1 e_1_2_10_29_1 e_1_2_10_27_1 e_1_2_10_28_1 e_1_2_10_25_1 e_1_2_10_26_1 |
| References_xml | – reference: Abdulkadiroğlu, A., P. Pathak, A. Roth, and T. Sönmez, 2005b, "The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, 95, 368-371. – reference: Nalbantian, H.R., and A. Schotter, 1995, "Matching and Efficiency in the Baseball Free-Agent System: An Experimental Examination," Journal of Labor Economics, 13, 1-31. – reference: Olson, M., and D. Porter, 1994, "An Experimental Examination into the Design of Decentralized Methods to Solve the Assignment Problem with and without Money," Economic Theory, 4, 11-40. – reference: Haruvy, E., A. Roth, and M.U. Ünver, 2006, "The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 30, 457-486. – reference: Guillen, P., and O. Kesten, 2012, "Matching Markets with Mixed Ownership: The Case for A Real-life Assignment Mechanism," International Economic Review, 53, 1027-1046. – reference: Klijn, F., J. Pais, and M. Vorsatz, 2013, "Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment," Experimental Economics, 16, 1-22. – reference: Pápai, S., 2000, "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, 68, 1403-1433. – reference: Mullin, C.H., and D.H. Reiley, 2006, "Recombinant Estimation for Normal-Form Games with Applications to Auctions and Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, 54, 159-182. – reference: Chen, Y., and T. Sönmez, 2006, "School Choice: An Experimental Study," Journal of Economic Theory, 127, 202-231. – reference: Roth, A.E., T. Sönmez, and M.U. Ünver, 2004, "Kidney Exchange," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 457-488. – reference: Baccara, M., A. Imrohoroglu, A. Wilson, and L. Yariv, 2012, "A Field Study on Matching with Network Externalities," American Economic Review, 102, 1773-1804. – reference: Pais, J., and A. Pintér, 2008, "School Choice and Information: An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, 64, 303-328. – reference: Gale, D., and L. Shapley, 1962, "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9-15. – reference: Chen, Y., and T. Sönmez, 2004, "An Experimental Study of House Allocation Mechanisms," Economics Letters, 83, 137-140. – reference: Chen, Y., and T. Sönmez, 2002, "Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, 92, 1669-1686. – reference: Shapley, L., and H. Scarf, 1974, "On Cores and Indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, 23-28. – reference: Kagel, J., and A. Roth, 2000, "The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 201-235. – reference: Abdulkadiroğlu, A. and T. Sönmez, 2003, "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, 93, 729-747. – reference: Krishna, A. and M.U. Ünver, 2008, "Improving the Efficiency of Course Bidding at Business Schools: Field and Laboratory Studies," Marketing Science 27, 262-282. – reference: Pais, J., A. Pintér, and R.F. Veszteg, 2011, "College Admissions and the Role of Information: An Experimental Study," International Economic Review, 52, 713-737. – reference: Abdulkadiroğlu, A. and T. Sönmez, 1999, "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, 88, 233-260. – reference: Calsamiglia, C., G. Haeringer, and F. Klijn, 2010, "Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, 100, 1860-1874. – reference: Kurino, M., 2014, "House Allocation with Overlapping Generations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6, 258-289. – reference: Roth, A.E., T. Sönmez, and M.U. Ünver,2005, "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, 125, 151-188. – reference: Abdulkadiroğlu, A., P. Pathak, and A. Roth, 2005a, "The New York High School Match," American Economic Review, 95, 364-367. – reference: Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor, 1990, Two-Sided Matching: A Study on Game - Theoretic Modelling, Cambridge University Press Cambridge. – reference: Ünver, M.U., 2005, "On the Survival of Some Unstable Two-Sided Matching Mechanisms," International Journal of Game Theory, 33, 239-254. – volume: 83 start-page: 137 year: 2004 end-page: 140 article-title: An Experimental Study of House Allocation Mechanisms publication-title: Economics Letters – year: 2011 – volume: 127 start-page: 202 year: 2006 end-page: 231 article-title: School Choice: An Experimental Study publication-title: Journal of Economic Theory – volume: 13 start-page: 1 year: 1995 end-page: 31 article-title: Matching and Efficiency in the Baseball Free‐Agent System: An Experimental Examination publication-title: Journal of Labor Economics – volume: 6 start-page: 258 year: 2014 end-page: 289 article-title: House Allocation with Overlapping Generations publication-title: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics – volume: 52 start-page: 713 year: 2011 end-page: 737 article-title: College Admissions and the Role of Information: An Experimental Study publication-title: International Economic Review – volume: 4 start-page: 11 year: 1994 end-page: 40 article-title: An Experimental Examination into the Design of Decentralized Methods to Solve the Assignment Problem with and without Money publication-title: Economic Theory – volume: 95 start-page: 364 year: 2005a end-page: 367 article-title: The New York High School Match publication-title: American Economic Review – volume: 85 start-page: 232 year: 2014 end-page: 251 – volume: 53 start-page: 1027 year: 2012 end-page: 1046 article-title: Matching Markets with Mixed Ownership: The Case for A Real‐life Assignment Mechanism publication-title: International Economic Review – volume: 68 start-page: 1403 year: 2000 end-page: 1433 article-title: Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange publication-title: Econometrica – volume: 88 start-page: 233 year: 1999 end-page: 260 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| SubjectTerms | Allocations Behavioral decision theory Dictatorship Housing Participation Queuing theory Ratings & rankings Squatters Studies Tenants Truth |
| Title | Tiered Housing Allocation with Preannounced Rankings: An Experimental Analysis |
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