Utility function security in artificially intelligent agents

The notion of 'wireheading', or direct reward centre stimulation of the brain, is a well-known concept in neuroscience. In this paper, we examine the corresponding issue of reward (utility) function integrity in artificially intelligent machines. We survey the relevant literature and propo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of experimental & theoretical artificial intelligence Vol. 26; no. 3; pp. 373 - 389
Main Author Yampolskiy, Roman V.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Abingdon Taylor & Francis 03.07.2014
Taylor & Francis Ltd
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ISSN0952-813X
1362-3079
DOI10.1080/0952813X.2014.895114

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Summary:The notion of 'wireheading', or direct reward centre stimulation of the brain, is a well-known concept in neuroscience. In this paper, we examine the corresponding issue of reward (utility) function integrity in artificially intelligent machines. We survey the relevant literature and propose a number of potential solutions to ensure the integrity of our artificial assistants. Overall, we conclude that wireheading in rational self-improving optimisers above a certain capacity remains an unsolved problem despite opinion of many that such machines will choose not to wirehead. A relevant issue of literalness in goal setting also remains largely unsolved and we suggest that the development of a non-ambiguous knowledge transfer language might be a step in the right direction.
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ISSN:0952-813X
1362-3079
DOI:10.1080/0952813X.2014.895114