Preferences: neither behavioural nor mental

Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEconomics and philosophy Vol. 35; no. 3; pp. 383 - 401
Main Author Guala, Francesco
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.11.2019
Subjects
Behavioral economics
Behavioral psychology
Contemporary literature
Decision making
Economics
Economists
Game theory
Mental states
Physics
Pizza
Positivism
Preferences
behavioural economics
choice
dispositions
Preference
mental states
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ISSN0266-2671
1474-0028
1474-0028
DOI10.1017/S0266267118000512

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Summary:Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theory and behavioural economics. Preferences are belief-dependent dispositions with a multiply realizable causal basis, which explains why economists are reluctant to make a commitment about their interpretation.
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ISSN:0266-2671
1474-0028
1474-0028
DOI:10.1017/S0266267118000512