An Iterated Projection Approach to Variational Problems Under Generalized Convexity Constraints

The principal-agent problem in economics leads to variational problems subject to global constraints of b -convexity on the admissible functions, capturing the so-called incentive-compatibility constraints. Typical examples are minimization problems subject to a convexity constraint. In a recent pat...

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Published inApplied mathematics & optimization Vol. 76; no. 3; pp. 565 - 592
Main Authors Carlier, Guillaume, Dupuis, Xavier
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer US 01.12.2017
Springer Nature B.V
Springer Verlag (Germany)
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ISSN0095-4616
1432-0606
1432-0606
DOI10.1007/s00245-016-9361-5

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Summary:The principal-agent problem in economics leads to variational problems subject to global constraints of b -convexity on the admissible functions, capturing the so-called incentive-compatibility constraints. Typical examples are minimization problems subject to a convexity constraint. In a recent pathbreaking article, Figalli et al. (J Econ Theory 146(2):454–478, 2011 ) identified conditions which ensure convexity of the principal-agent problem and thus raised hope on the development of numerical methods. We consider special instances of projections problems over b -convex functions and show how they can be solved numerically using Dykstra’s iterated projection algorithm to handle the b -convexity constraint in the framework of (Figalli et al. in J Econ Theory 146(2):454–478, 2011 ). Our method also turns out to be simple for convex envelope computations.
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ISSN:0095-4616
1432-0606
1432-0606
DOI:10.1007/s00245-016-9361-5