Finite Rational Self-Deceivers

I raise three puzzles concerning self-deception: (i) a conceptual paradox, (ii) a dilemma about how to understand human cognitive evolution, and (iii) a tension between the fact of self-deception and Davidson's interpretive view. I advance solutions to the first two and lay a groundwork for add...

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Published in	Philosophical studies Vol. 139; no. 2; pp. 191 - 208
Main Author	Van Leeuwen, D. S. Neil
Format	Journal Article
Language	English
Published	Dordrecht Springer 01.05.2008 Springer Netherlands Sringer Springer Nature B.V
Subjects	Belief Biological adaptation Cognition & reasoning Cognitive ability Conceptual frameworks Deception Desire Dissertations & theses Education Epistemology Essays Ethics Evolutionary psychology General philosophy. Metaphysics Human evolution Irony Knowledge Memory Metaphysics Mind Paradoxes Philosophy Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mind Puzzles Rationality Reasoning Self concept Self deception New York Belief Paradox Spandrel Epistemic norm Rationality Attention Self-deception Evolutionary psychology Adaptation Philosophy
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ISSN	0031-8116 1573-0883
DOI	10.1007/s11098-007-9112-1

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Summary:	I raise three puzzles concerning self-deception: (i) a conceptual paradox, (ii) a dilemma about how to understand human cognitive evolution, and (iii) a tension between the fact of self-deception and Davidson's interpretive view. I advance solutions to the first two and lay a groundwork for addressing the third. The capacity for self-deception, I argue, is a spandrel, in Gould's and Lewontin's sense, of other mental traits, i.e., a structural byproduct. The irony is that the mental traits of which self-deception is a spandrel/byproduct are themselves rational.
Bibliography:	ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 content type line 14
ISSN:	0031-8116 1573-0883
DOI:	10.1007/s11098-007-9112-1