Are Propositional Attitudes Mental States?
I present an argument that propositional attitudes are not mental states. In a nutshell, the argument is that if propositional attitudes are mental states, then only minded beings could have them; but there are reasons to think that some non-minded beings could bear propositional attitudes. To illus...
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| Published in | Minds and machines (Dordrecht) Vol. 32; no. 3; pp. 417 - 432 |
|---|---|
| Main Author | |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
| Published |
Dordrecht
Springer Netherlands
01.09.2022
Springer Nature B.V |
| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
| ISSN | 0924-6495 1572-8641 |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11023-022-09594-x |
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| Abstract | I present an argument that propositional attitudes are not mental states. In a nutshell, the argument is that if propositional attitudes are mental states, then only minded beings could have them; but there are reasons to think that some non-minded beings could bear propositional attitudes. To illustrate this, I appeal to cases of
genuine group intentionality
. I argue that these are cases in which some group entities bear propositional attitudes, but they are not subjects of mental states. Although propositional attitudes are not mental states, I propose that they are typically co-instantiated with mental states. In an attempt to explain this co-instantiation, I suggest that propositional attitudes of minded beings are typically realized by mental states. |
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| AbstractList | I present an argument that propositional attitudes are not mental states. In a nutshell, the argument is that if propositional attitudes are mental states, then only minded beings could have them; but there are reasons to think that some non-minded beings could bear propositional attitudes. To illustrate this, I appeal to cases of genuine group intentionality. I argue that these are cases in which some group entities bear propositional attitudes, but they are not subjects of mental states. Although propositional attitudes are not mental states, I propose that they are typically co-instantiated with mental states. In an attempt to explain this co-instantiation, I suggest that propositional attitudes of minded beings are typically realized by mental states. I present an argument that propositional attitudes are not mental states. In a nutshell, the argument is that if propositional attitudes are mental states, then only minded beings could have them; but there are reasons to think that some non-minded beings could bear propositional attitudes. To illustrate this, I appeal to cases of genuine group intentionality . I argue that these are cases in which some group entities bear propositional attitudes, but they are not subjects of mental states. Although propositional attitudes are not mental states, I propose that they are typically co-instantiated with mental states. In an attempt to explain this co-instantiation, I suggest that propositional attitudes of minded beings are typically realized by mental states. |
| Author | Baysan, Umut |
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| References | BaddorfMPhenomenal consciousness, collective mentality, and collective moral responsibilityPhilosophical Studies20171742769278610.1007/s11098-016-0809-x SchwitzgebelEA phenomenal, dispositional account of beliefNoûs20023624927510.1111/1468-0068.00370 BrentanoFPsychology from an empirical Standpoint, transl. by A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and L. McAlister1973Routledge Le BonGPsychologie des Foules1895Germer ChalmersDThe conscious mind1996Oxford University Press0921.00007 DennettDThe intentional stance1989MIT Press RyleGThe concept of mind1949Barnes & Noble BayneTMontagueMCognitive phenomenology2011Oxford University Press10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.001.0001 HuebnerBMacrocognition2014Oxford University Press KriegelUThe varieties of consciousness2015Oxford University Press10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199846122.001.0001 HorganTTiensonJChalmersDThe intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionalityPhilosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings2002Oxford University Press520533 DennettDIntentional systemsThe Journal of Philosophy1971688710610.2307/2025382 GilbertMPilchmanDLackeyJBelief, acceptance, and what happens in groupsEssays in collective epistemology2014Oxford University Press18921210.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.003.0009 StrawsonGBayneTMontagueMCognitive phenomenology: real lifeCognitive phenomenology2011Oxford University Press28532510.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0013 DretskeFExplaining behavior1988MIT Press PutnamHiPutnamHThe nature of mental statesMind, language, and reality1975Cambridge University Press42944010.1017/CBO9780511625251.023 SeagerWConsciousness, information, and panpsychismJournal of Consciousness Studies19952272288 WilsonRBoundaries of the mind: The individual in the fragile sciences2004Oxford University Press ListCWhat is it like to be a group agent?Nous20185229531910.1111/nous.12162 RobinsonWBayneTMontagueMA frugal view of cognitive phenomenologyCognitive Phenomenology2011OxfordOxford University Press19721410.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0009 TononiGiulioKochChristofConsciousness: Here, there and everywhere?Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B201537016682014016710.1098/rstb.2014.0167 TollefsenDGroups as agents2015Polity Press StrawsonGMental reality1994MIT Press ListCPettitPGroup agency: The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents2011Oxford University Press10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591565.001.0001 BaysanURealization relations in metaphysicsMinds and Machines20152524726010.1007/s11023-015-9366-x SchwitzgebelEIf materialism is true, the United States is probably consciousPhilosophical Studies20151721697172110.1007/s11098-014-0387-8 ArmstrongDMA materialist theory of the mind1968Routledge & Kegan Paul GilbertMOn social facts1989Princeton University Press Quilty-DunnJMandelbaumEAgainst dispositionalism: belief in cognitive sciencePhilosophical Studies20181752353237210.1007/s11098-017-0962-x BlockNedBlockNTroubles with functionalismReadings in the philosophy of psychology1980Harvard University Press268305 OvergaardSSaliceAConsciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesisSynthese20211981597162110.1007/s11229-019-02152-6 RupertRChallenges to the hypothesis of extended cognitionThe Journal of Philosophy200410138942810.5840/jphil2004101826 PittDThe phenomenology of cognition or what is it like to think that P?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research20046913610.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00382.x Theiner, Georg and O’Connor, Timothy. 2010. “The emergence of group cognition,” In: A. Corradini & T. O’ Connor (Eds.) Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge ShoemakerSSome varieties of functionalismPhilosophical Topics1981129311910.5840/philtopics198112145 KnobeJPrinzJIntuitions about consciousness: Experimental studiesPhenomenology and Cognitive Sciences20077678310.1007/s11097-007-9066-y FodorJThe language of thought1975Cromwell RoelofsLCombining minds2019Oxford University Press10.1093/oso/9780190859053.001.0001 BirdASocial knowing: The social sense of ‘scientific knowledge’Philosophical Perspectives201024235610.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00184.x ChalmersDAlterTNagasawaYPanpsychism and panprotopsychismConsciousness in the physical world: Perspectives on russellian monism2015Oxford University Press BaysanUGibbSCEmergence, function, and realizationRoutledge handbook of emergence2019AbingdonRoutledge778610.4324/9781315675213-6 KimJPhysicalism or something near enough2005Princeton University Press D Dennett (9594_CR9) 1971; 68 T Bayne (9594_CR3) 2011 W Robinson (9594_CR505) 2011 E Schwitzgebel (9594_CR30) 2002; 36 S Overgaard (9594_CR23) 2021; 198 G Ryle (9594_CR29) 1949 J Quilty-Dunn (9594_CR26) 2018; 175 L Roelofs (9594_CR27) 2019 D Tollefsen (9594_CR37) 2015 J Knobe (9594_CR18) 2007; 7 M Baddorf (9594_CR2) 2017; 174 R Rupert (9594_CR28) 2004; 101 J Fodor (9594_CR12) 1975 W Seager (9594_CR32) 1995; 2 U Baysan (9594_CR500) 2015; 25 D Pitt (9594_CR24) 2004; 69 F Dretske (9594_CR11) 1988 G Le Bon (9594_CR20) 1895 M Gilbert (9594_CR14) 2014 J Kim (9594_CR17) 2005 C List (9594_CR21) 2018; 52 U Kriegel (9594_CR19) 2015 R Wilson (9594_CR39) 2004 G Strawson (9594_CR34) 1994 M Gilbert (9594_CR13) 1989 G Strawson (9594_CR35) 2011 DM Armstrong (9594_CR1) 1968 D Chalmers (9594_CR8) 2015 U Baysan (9594_CR501) 2019 Ned Block (9594_CR5) 1980 T Horgan (9594_CR15) 2002 9594_CR36 A Bird (9594_CR4) 2010; 24 D Chalmers (9594_CR7) 1996 Hi Putnam (9594_CR25) 1975 E Schwitzgebel (9594_CR31) 2015; 172 S Shoemaker (9594_CR33) 1981; 12 B Huebner (9594_CR16) 2014 D Dennett (9594_CR10) 1989 Giulio Tononi (9594_CR38) 2015; 370 F Brentano (9594_CR6) 1973 C List (9594_CR22) 2011 |
| References_xml | – reference: Theiner, Georg and O’Connor, Timothy. 2010. “The emergence of group cognition,” In: A. Corradini & T. O’ Connor (Eds.) Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge – reference: RoelofsLCombining minds2019Oxford University Press10.1093/oso/9780190859053.001.0001 – reference: BaysanUGibbSCEmergence, function, and realizationRoutledge handbook of emergence2019AbingdonRoutledge778610.4324/9781315675213-6 – reference: DretskeFExplaining behavior1988MIT Press – reference: KimJPhysicalism or something near enough2005Princeton University Press – reference: ListCWhat is it like to be a group agent?Nous20185229531910.1111/nous.12162 – reference: SchwitzgebelEIf materialism is true, the United States is probably consciousPhilosophical Studies20151721697172110.1007/s11098-014-0387-8 – reference: RobinsonWBayneTMontagueMA frugal view of cognitive phenomenologyCognitive Phenomenology2011OxfordOxford University Press19721410.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0009 – reference: FodorJThe language of thought1975Cromwell – reference: Le BonGPsychologie des Foules1895Germer – reference: OvergaardSSaliceAConsciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesisSynthese20211981597162110.1007/s11229-019-02152-6 – reference: PittDThe phenomenology of cognition or what is it like to think that P?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research20046913610.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00382.x – reference: WilsonRBoundaries of the mind: The individual in the fragile sciences2004Oxford University Press – reference: SchwitzgebelEA phenomenal, dispositional account of beliefNoûs20023624927510.1111/1468-0068.00370 – reference: PutnamHiPutnamHThe nature of mental statesMind, language, and reality1975Cambridge University Press42944010.1017/CBO9780511625251.023 – reference: GilbertMOn social facts1989Princeton University Press – reference: Quilty-DunnJMandelbaumEAgainst dispositionalism: belief in cognitive sciencePhilosophical Studies20181752353237210.1007/s11098-017-0962-x – reference: RyleGThe concept of mind1949Barnes & Noble – reference: BaysanURealization relations in metaphysicsMinds and Machines20152524726010.1007/s11023-015-9366-x – reference: ChalmersDAlterTNagasawaYPanpsychism and panprotopsychismConsciousness in the physical world: Perspectives on russellian monism2015Oxford University Press – reference: StrawsonGBayneTMontagueMCognitive phenomenology: real lifeCognitive phenomenology2011Oxford University Press28532510.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0013 – reference: BayneTMontagueMCognitive phenomenology2011Oxford University Press10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.001.0001 – reference: RupertRChallenges to the hypothesis of extended cognitionThe Journal of Philosophy200410138942810.5840/jphil2004101826 – reference: DennettDThe intentional stance1989MIT Press – reference: HuebnerBMacrocognition2014Oxford University Press – reference: BirdASocial knowing: The social sense of ‘scientific knowledge’Philosophical Perspectives201024235610.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00184.x – reference: BlockNedBlockNTroubles with functionalismReadings in the philosophy of psychology1980Harvard University Press268305 – reference: BaddorfMPhenomenal consciousness, collective mentality, and collective moral responsibilityPhilosophical Studies20171742769278610.1007/s11098-016-0809-x – reference: KriegelUThe varieties of consciousness2015Oxford University Press10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199846122.001.0001 – reference: SeagerWConsciousness, information, and panpsychismJournal of Consciousness Studies19952272288 – reference: BrentanoFPsychology from an empirical Standpoint, transl. by A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and L. McAlister1973Routledge – reference: ChalmersDThe conscious mind1996Oxford University Press0921.00007 – reference: ShoemakerSSome varieties of functionalismPhilosophical Topics1981129311910.5840/philtopics198112145 – reference: ArmstrongDMA materialist theory of the mind1968Routledge & Kegan Paul – reference: StrawsonGMental reality1994MIT Press – reference: ListCPettitPGroup agency: The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents2011Oxford University Press10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591565.001.0001 – reference: TollefsenDGroups as agents2015Polity Press – reference: GilbertMPilchmanDLackeyJBelief, acceptance, and what happens in groupsEssays in collective epistemology2014Oxford University Press18921210.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.003.0009 – reference: HorganTTiensonJChalmersDThe intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionalityPhilosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings2002Oxford University Press520533 – reference: KnobeJPrinzJIntuitions about consciousness: Experimental studiesPhenomenology and Cognitive Sciences20077678310.1007/s11097-007-9066-y – reference: DennettDIntentional systemsThe Journal of Philosophy1971688710610.2307/2025382 – reference: TononiGiulioKochChristofConsciousness: Here, there and everywhere?Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B201537016682014016710.1098/rstb.2014.0167 – start-page: 77 volume-title: Routledge handbook of emergence year: 2019 ident: 9594_CR501 doi: 10.4324/9781315675213-6 – volume: 174 start-page: 2769 year: 2017 ident: 9594_CR2 publication-title: Philosophical Studies doi: 10.1007/s11098-016-0809-x – volume-title: Physicalism or something near enough year: 2005 ident: 9594_CR17 – volume-title: The varieties of consciousness year: 2015 ident: 9594_CR19 doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199846122.001.0001 – volume: 101 start-page: 389 year: 2004 ident: 9594_CR28 publication-title: The Journal of Philosophy doi: 10.5840/jphil2004101826 – volume: 172 start-page: 1697 year: 2015 ident: 9594_CR31 publication-title: Philosophical Studies doi: 10.1007/s11098-014-0387-8 – volume: 12 start-page: 93 year: 1981 ident: 9594_CR33 publication-title: Philosophical Topics doi: 10.5840/philtopics198112145 – volume-title: A materialist theory of the mind year: 1968 ident: 9594_CR1 – volume: 24 start-page: 23 year: 2010 ident: 9594_CR4 publication-title: Philosophical Perspectives doi: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00184.x – start-page: 520 volume-title: Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings year: 2002 ident: 9594_CR15 – ident: 9594_CR36 – volume-title: Cognitive phenomenology year: 2011 ident: 9594_CR3 doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.001.0001 – volume-title: On social facts year: 1989 ident: 9594_CR13 – volume: 198 start-page: 1597 year: 2021 ident: 9594_CR23 publication-title: Synthese doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02152-6 – volume-title: The concept of mind year: 1949 ident: 9594_CR29 – volume-title: Boundaries of the mind: The individual in the fragile sciences year: 2004 ident: 9594_CR39 – volume: 7 start-page: 67 year: 2007 ident: 9594_CR18 publication-title: Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences doi: 10.1007/s11097-007-9066-y – volume-title: The language of thought year: 1975 ident: 9594_CR12 – start-page: 189 volume-title: Essays in collective epistemology year: 2014 ident: 9594_CR14 doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.003.0009 – volume-title: Groups as agents year: 2015 ident: 9594_CR37 – volume: 175 start-page: 2353 year: 2018 ident: 9594_CR26 publication-title: Philosophical Studies doi: 10.1007/s11098-017-0962-x – volume-title: Group agency: The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents year: 2011 ident: 9594_CR22 doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591565.001.0001 – volume: 36 start-page: 249 year: 2002 ident: 9594_CR30 publication-title: Noûs doi: 10.1111/1468-0068.00370 – start-page: 285 volume-title: Cognitive phenomenology year: 2011 ident: 9594_CR35 doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.003.0013 – volume-title: Mental reality year: 1994 ident: 9594_CR34 doi: 10.7551/mitpress/4551.001.0001 – volume-title: Psychologie des Foules year: 1895 ident: 9594_CR20 – volume: 370 start-page: 20140167 issue: 1668 year: 2015 ident: 9594_CR38 publication-title: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B doi: 10.1098/rstb.2014.0167 – volume: 69 start-page: 1 year: 2004 ident: 9594_CR24 publication-title: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00382.x – volume: 25 start-page: 247 year: 2015 ident: 9594_CR500 publication-title: Minds and Machines doi: 10.1007/s11023-015-9366-x – volume-title: Psychology from an empirical Standpoint, transl. by A.C. 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| Snippet | I present an argument that propositional attitudes are not mental states. In a nutshell, the argument is that if propositional attitudes are mental states,... |
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| StartPage | 417 |
| SubjectTerms | Artificial Intelligence Attitudes Cognitive Psychology Computer Science Economics Game Theory General Article Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Science Social and Behav. Sciences Theory of Computation |
| Title | Are Propositional Attitudes Mental States? |
| URI | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11023-022-09594-x https://www.proquest.com/docview/2715131570 |
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