Self-Deception: A Case Study in Folk Conceptual Structure

• Published in: Review of philosophy and psychology Vol. 16; no. 2; pp. 545 - 572
• Main Authors: Isern-Mas, Carme, Hannikainen, Ivar R.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.06.2025; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Cognitive Psychology; Deception; Developmental Psychology; Education; Epistemology; Neurosciences; Philosophy; Philosophy of Mind; Philosophy of Science; Experimental philosophy; Folk psychology; Prototype concepts; Conflict; Disagreement; Self-deception; Categorization
• ISSN: 1878-5158; 1878-5166; 1878-5166
• DOI: 10.1007/s13164-024-00743-y

Theoretical debates around the concept of self-deception revolve around identifying the conditions for a behavior to qualify as self-deception. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that various candidate features—such as intent, belief change, and motive—are treated as sufficient, but non-necessary, conditions according to the lay concept of self-deception. This led us to ask whether there are multiple lay concepts, such that different participants endorse competing theories (the disagreement view), or whether individual participants assign partial weight to various features and consequently waver in cases of middling similarity (the conflict view). In Experiment 3, by-participant regression models uncovered that most participants additively consider multiple characteristics of the prototype of self-deception, while only a minority of participants treat a characteristic (or a combination thereof) as necessary and sufficient. In sum, by disambiguating interpersonal disagreement and intrapersonal conflict in a within-subjects design, the present experiments indicate that the lay concept may primarily exhibit a prototype structure. In closing, we suggest that future research deploying this method may help to explain why experimental research on philosophical concepts often engenders partial support for competing theories.