Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Battery Stacks Using Input Noise-Aware Nonlinear State Estimation and Cumulative Sum Algorithms

• Published in: IEEE transactions on industry applications Vol. 59; no. 6; pp. 7800 - 7812
• Main Authors: Obrien, Victoria, Rao, Vittal S., Trevizan, Rodrigo D.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York IEEE 01.11.2023; The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
• Subjects: Algorithms; Anomaly detection; Batteries; cumulative sum; Current measurement; Data models; Electric potential; ENERGY STORAGE; equivalent circuit model; Equivalent circuits; Extended Kalman filter; false data injection attacks; Input variables; Integrated circuit modeling; Mathematical models; Noise measurement; noisy input; Sensors; smart grid; State estimation; State of charge; Storage systems; Voltage
• ISSN: 0093-9994; 1939-9367; 1939-9367
• DOI: 10.1109/TIA.2023.3308548

Grid-scale battery energy storage systems (BESSs) are vulnerable to false data injection attacks (FDIAs), which could be used to disrupt state of charge (SoC) estimation. Inaccurate SoC estimation has negative impacts on system availability, reliability, safety, and the cost of operation. In this article a combination of a Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm and an improved input noise-aware extended Kalman filter (INAEKF) is proposed for the detection and identification of FDIAs in the voltage and current sensors of a battery stack. The series-connected stack is represented by equivalent circuit models, the SoC is modeled with a charge reservoir model and the states are estimated using the INAEKF. The root mean squared error of the states' estimation by the modified INAEKF was found to be superior to the traditional EKF. By employing the INAEKF, this article addresses the research gap that many state estimators make asymmetrical assumptions about the noise corrupting the system. Additionally, the INAEKF estimates the input allowing for the identification of FDIA, which many alternative methods are unable to achieve. The proposed algorithm was able to detect attacks in the voltage and current sensors in 99.16% of test cases, with no false positives. Utilizing the INAEKF compared to the standard EKF allowed for the identification of FDIA in the input of the system in 98.43% of test cases.