Materialism and the Subjectivity of Experience

• Published in: Philosophia (Ramat Gan) Vol. 39; no. 1; pp. 39 - 49
• Main Author: BERNAL VELISQUEZ, Reinaldo J
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.03.2011; Springer; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Cognition & reasoning; Consciousness; Education; Epistemology; Ethics; Metaphysics; Mind and body. Personal identity; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Mind; Philosophy of Science; Psychology; Metaphysics of mind; Consciousness; Explanatory gap; Subjectivity; Materialism; Metaphysics; Philosophie des Geistes
• ISSN: 0048-3893; 1574-9274
• DOI: 10.1007/s11406-010-9276-3

The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible with materialist metaphysics. In this paper I criticise one particular argument that is based on the idea that for something to be real it must (at least in principle) be accessible from an intersubjective perspective. I argue that the exclusively subjective access to phenomenal contents can be explained by the very particular nature of the epistemological relation holding between a subject and his own mental states. Accordingly, this subjectivity does not compel us to deny the possibility that phenomenal contents are ontologically objective properties. First, I present the general form of the argument that I will discuss. Second, I show that this argument makes use of a criterion of reality that is not applicable to the case of subjective experience. Third, I discuss a plausible objection and give an argument for rejecting observation models of self-knowledge of phenomenal contents. These models fall prey to the homunculus illusion.