Impact of three carbon emission reduction policies on carbon verification behavior: An analysis based on evolutionary game theory

• Published in: Energy (Oxford) Vol. 295; p. 130926
• Main Authors: Wu, Xiaoping, Liu, Peng, Yang, Lin, Shi, Zhuangfei, Lao, Yongshuai
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier Ltd 15.05.2024
• Subjects: carbon; carbon markets; Carbon tax policy; Carbon verification; Collusive behavior; compliance; Dynamic penalty mechanism; Emission trading policy; energy; evolution; Evolutionary game; game theory; issues and policy; ETP; Collusive behavior; CT&ET; Carbon tax policy; Evolutionary game; Emission trading policy; Carbon verification; CTP; Dynamic penalty mechanism
• ISSN: 0360-5442
• DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2024.130926

Carbon tax and emission trading compound policy (CT&ET), carbon tax policy (CTP), and emission trading policy (ETP) support countries in achieving "dual carbon" goals. Carbon verification is essential to these policies' efficacy. Policy changes will affect system equilibrium and present unclear risks to policy implementation. This paper compared the impact of three carbon emission reduction policies on the behavior of carbon verification subjects under various conditions, three policies' benefits and drawbacks at different stages, and proposed a dynamic penalty mechanism to restrain subject infractions. Finally, the simulations revealed three policies of system evolution path and parameter sensitivity in various scenarios. CT&ET best guarantees carbon verification quality has a high-risk tolerance, and restricts infractions in most scenes. The excessively conservative carbon quota and severe collusion penalty make CTP optimal for limiting ECE false reports. ETP reduces collusion best when carbon quotas are appropriately allocated. Adjusting taxes and carbon prices, increasing verification levels, and reducing false reporting will be easier under CTP and ETP. Dynamic penalties are particularly effective in limiting infractions. Static penalties stabilize compliance behavior effectively. This study proposed a policy parameter framework and optimization mechanism to improve the carbon verification mechanism and accelerate the "dual carbon" goal. •We innovatively introduce important factors such as verification level, collusion punishment risk, and profit distribution. Introducing carbon verification into the study of three carbon reduction policies expands the field of carbon verification and the study of carbon emission reduction policies.•We have innovatively revealed the advantages and disadvantages of carbon reduction policies under different conditions. Taking into account cost and operability, we have designed a strategy parameter system and dynamic penalty mechanism to prevent violations by entities. We can derive an ideal system evolution trajectory and stability.•The findings provide theoretical guidance for conducting CT&ET, CTP, and ETP in countries to ensure the quality of carbon verification, improve the efficacy of carbon emission reduction policies, and meet "dual carbon" objectives on time.