Green Product Market Development Strategy of Mobile Network Group Buying Community: Based on Three-Party Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis

• Published in: Wireless communications and mobile computing Vol. 2021; no. 1
• Main Author: Ai, Zhihong
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford Hindawi 2021; John Wiley & Sons, Inc
• Subjects: Asymmetry; Buying; Carbon; Consumers; Credibility; Game theory; Government; Hypotheses; Identification systems; Purchasing; Reputations; Sustainable development; Symmetry; China
• ISSN: 1530-8669; 1530-8677; 1530-8677
• DOI: 10.1155/2021/4746723

With the advent of the 5G era, the mobile network group buying community dominated by focusing on social relations shows great development potential. However, in the mobile network group buying community, the mixed information makes the information environment of the community more complex. Information asymmetry will lead to “mistakes” in consumers’ choice, making it impossible for some important markets to be fully developed. Considering the gains and losses of three interest subjects—governments, enterprises, and consumers in the green product market under information symmetry, in this paper, an evolutionary game model involving governments, enterprises, and consumers was built. Numerical experiments and simulation were performed using SciPy, a scientific computing library of Python, to study the main factors influencing the healthy development of the green product market. The research results showed under information symmetry, when the governments’ benefit from increased government credibility was higher than the cost of governments for screening the information of enterprises’ products and identifying the green products, the expected fine of enterprises for producing high carbon products was higher than the difference between the actual cost increment and the actual income increment of enterprises for producing green products, and the utility perception of consumers from purchasing green products was higher than the cost of consumers for purchasing green products, the three-party game would evolve to a socially ideal stable state. The above conclusions provide useful policy suggestions for governments to vigorously develop the green product market.