JRODOS customization for Pakistan and assessment of the consequences of a hypothetical nuclear accident

• Published in: Journal of radiological protection Vol. 43; no. 1; pp. 11517 - 11535
• Main Authors: Hussain, Mazzammal, Mehboob, Khurram, Ilyas, Syed Zafar, Smith, Kilian, Shaheen, Saima
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: England IOP Publishing 01.03.2023
• Subjects: decision support tools; JRODOS; nuclear accident; Nuclear Energy; Pakistan; Radioactive Hazard Release - prevention & control; response phase; Pakistan; decision support tools; nuclear accident; JRODOS; response phase
• ISSN: 0952-4746; 1361-6498; 1361-6498
• DOI: 10.1088/1361-6498/acb82c

Since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, decision support systems and modelling tools have been utilized in response to nuclear and radiological emergencies. The java-based real-time online decision support system (JRODOS) is a decision support tool that can be utilised in response to an emergency in managing off-site radiological consequences. This article documents the customization and use of JRODOS for Pakistan. JRODOS was tailored to the local Pakistan conditions, and a case study of a theoretical nuclear power plant accident was used to assess JRODOS’s feasibility as a decision support tool. A worst-case probabilistic accident scenario was used to identify zones and areas where urgent protective actions, early protective actions and food restriction and other response actions could be required. The areas and distances identified for the implementation of protective and response actions for such a hypothetical accident were found to be in agreement with the emergency planning zones and distances suggested by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Additionally, the implications of meteorological and source term input parameters on predicting the radiation doses to members of the public were investigated. It was identified that the output of such tools strongly depends on the availability and accuracy of the input parameters, such as radioactive release and meteorological data. Limitations and uncertainties associated with these tools need to be considered in deciding on protective and other response actions in response to a nuclear accident. As established by the IAEA, protective and other response actions need to be applied on a graded approach, taking into account the protection strategy and uncertainties and limitations in the available information and criteria, based on the conditions at the facility and off-site.