An Abductive Defence of Truthmaker Realism

• Published in: Philosophy (London) Vol. 99; no. 4; pp. 563 - 595
• Main Author: Schipper, Arthur
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.10.2024
• ISSN: 0031-8191; 1469-817X
• DOI: 10.1017/S0031819124000238

This paper presents an abductive argument for realism and truthmaker realism as follows. A metaphysical theory is better if it ontologically accounts for truths better than its rivals (the Abductive Principle). Truthmaker realism gives us a better ontological account for truths than its antirealist truthmaker rivals (Abductive Step). So, truthmaker realism is better than antirealist rivals. It presents the truthmaker project as an abductive project which asks us what accounts best ontologically for our truths. Antirealisms, especially idealisms, fail against their realist rivals on various abductive criteria. Truthmaker realism is plagued by three main objections. Presenting an abductive argument for realism does two important things. First, it dissolves the standard objections. Second, it shows how truthmaker realism is overall better motivated than antirealist, pluralist, and neutralist rivals. Simple truthmaker principles added to a plausible abductive package of principles give us a straightforward argument for realism and against antirealism or any neutralist middle ground.