A non-cooperative game theory-based time-of-use tariffs joint optimization mechanism considering synergy of multiple provincial power grids under regional coordinated development strategy

Under regional coordinated development strategy, there is a pressing need to enhance existing time-of-use (TOU) tariffs formulation mechanism to address the issue of how to jointly optimize TOU tariffs for the provinces in a region. This paper proposes a TOU tariffs joint optimization mechanism. Fir...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEnergy (Oxford) Vol. 322; p. 135627
Main Authors Lin, Fangsen, Wang, Peng, Ding, Yihong, Wu, Jiaqi, Cao, Yujie
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier Ltd 01.05.2025
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ISSN0360-5442
DOI10.1016/j.energy.2025.135627

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Summary:Under regional coordinated development strategy, there is a pressing need to enhance existing time-of-use (TOU) tariffs formulation mechanism to address the issue of how to jointly optimize TOU tariffs for the provinces in a region. This paper proposes a TOU tariffs joint optimization mechanism. Firstly, a division method for regional agents is developed. In this method, all regional agents are divided into conventional agents (CAs) and region stability facilitation agents (RSFAs). When setting TOU tariffs, each CA focuses on the conditions of its province, while each RSFA will contemplate the conditions of both its province and region. Under a RSFAs selection strategy, all agent models will formulate TOU tariffs jointly, and constitute a joint optimization model. Secondly, the model will further constitute a non-cooperative game solved using diagonalization method and particle swarm optimization with linearly decreasing inertia weight (DM-IWPSO) algorithm. Moreover, multi-objective problems constituted by CA and RSFA models are transformed into single-objective problems by introducing two new cost indices. Finally, the proposed mechanism is tested in Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan power grid. The results indicate that the proposed mechanism maybe more conducive to maintaining the stability of the regional power grid and more beneficial for the implementation of regional coordinated development strategy. •A division method for regional agents is proposed.•Several non-cooperative games constituted by TOU-JOMs are established.•Two new indices used to concisely reflect the grid stability costs are introduced.•The DM-IWPSO algorithm for solving non-cooperative games is explored.•An optimization mechanism for provinces to set TOU tariffs jointly is designed.
ISSN:0360-5442
DOI:10.1016/j.energy.2025.135627