Effect of Aspiration and Mean Gain on the Emergence of Cooperation in Unidirectional Pedestrian Flow
When more than one pedestrian want to move to the same site, conflicts appear and thus the involved pedestrians play a motion game. In order to describe the emergence of cooperation during the conflict resolving process, an evolutionary cellular automation model is established considering the effect...
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| Published in | Communications in theoretical physics Vol. 59; no. 3; pp. 379 - 383 |
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| Main Author | |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
| Published |
01.03.2013
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| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
| ISSN | 0253-6102 |
| DOI | 10.1088/0253-6102/59/3/23 |
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| Summary: | When more than one pedestrian want to move to the same site, conflicts appear and thus the involved pedestrians play a motion game. In order to describe the emergence of cooperation during the conflict resolving process, an evolutionary cellular automation model is established considering the effect of aspiration and mean gain. In each game, pedestrian may be gentle cooperator or aggressive defector. We propose a set of win-stay-lose-shrift （WSLS） like rules for updating pedestrian＇s strategy. These rules prescribe that if the mean gain of current strategy between some given steps is larger than aspiration the strategy keeps, otherwise the strategy changes. The simulation results show that a high level aspiration will lead to more cooperation. With the increment of the statistic length, pedestrians will be more rational in decision making. It is also found that when the aspiration level is small enough and the statistic length is large enough ail the pedestrian will turn to defectors. We use the prisoner＇s dilernma rnodel to explain it. At last we discuss the effect of aspiration on fundamental diagram. |
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| Bibliography: | cooperation; evolutionary game; aspiration; mean gain 11-2592/O3 When more than one pedestrian want to move to the same site, conflicts appear and thus the involved pedestrians play a motion game. In order to describe the emergence of cooperation during the conflict resolving process, an evolutionary cellular automation model is established considering the effect of aspiration and mean gain. In each game, pedestrian may be gentle cooperator or aggressive defector. We propose a set of win-stay-lose-shrift （WSLS） like rules for updating pedestrian＇s strategy. These rules prescribe that if the mean gain of current strategy between some given steps is larger than aspiration the strategy keeps, otherwise the strategy changes. The simulation results show that a high level aspiration will lead to more cooperation. With the increment of the statistic length, pedestrians will be more rational in decision making. It is also found that when the aspiration level is small enough and the statistic length is large enough ail the pedestrian will turn to defectors. We use the prisoner＇s dilernma rnodel to explain it. At last we discuss the effect of aspiration on fundamental diagram. WANG Zi-Yang , MA Jian ,ZHAO Hui , QIN Yong,ZHU Wei and JIA Li-Min （1School of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China 2State Key Laboratory of Railway Control and Safety, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China 3School of Transportation and Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China 4State Key Laboratory of Fire Science, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China 5Key Lab of Public Safety, Beijing Academy of Science and Technology, Beijing 100083, China 6Beijing Research Center of Urban Systems Engineering, Beijing Academy of Science and Technology, Beijing 100083, China） ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
| ISSN: | 0253-6102 |
| DOI: | 10.1088/0253-6102/59/3/23 |