The Polysemy of the Concept of Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of European Constitutional Courts: A Potential Threat to Human Rights Protection?

The concept of human dignity is often invoked by constitutional courts in Europe and worldwide, especially in sensitive issues like protecting unborn life, end-of-life decisions, and prisoners’ conditions. However, its interpretation varies significantly across national and supranational bodies, suc...

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Published inInternational and comparative law review (Olomouc, Czech Republic) Vol. 24; no. 1; pp. 120 - 138
Main Author Baudoin, Marie-Élisabeth
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Olomouc Sciendo 01.09.2024
De Gruyter Poland
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ISSN2464-6601
1213-8770
2464-6601
DOI10.2478/iclr-2024-0008

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Summary:The concept of human dignity is often invoked by constitutional courts in Europe and worldwide, especially in sensitive issues like protecting unborn life, end-of-life decisions, and prisoners’ conditions. However, its interpretation varies significantly across national and supranational bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, leading to potential confusion and threats to common European standards. This paper explores whether a universal “language” of rights exists or if current interpretations create a “legal Babel.” Through a comparative analysis of France, Germany, and Hungary, the study illustrates how diverse uses of human dignity affect fundamental rights protection. It argues that while pluralistic interpretations are not inherently dangerous, certain judicial uses of the concept could undermine the coherence of the European legal order and weaken human rights. The paper emphasizes the need for a balanced approach to ensure that human dignity strengthens rather than compromises human rights.
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ISSN:2464-6601
1213-8770
2464-6601
DOI:10.2478/iclr-2024-0008