The Concept of Meaning

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author Hill, Thomas E.
Format eBook Book
LanguageEnglish
Published London Routledge 1971
Taylor and Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
Edition1
SeriesMuirhead library of philosophy
Subjects
Meaning (Philosophy)
Philosophy
Sky
Implicative Way
Causal Meanings
functions
Inclined
intentional
Verification Criteria
Prior Connections
Predicate Expression
Declarative Sentences
experience
Implicative Meaning
Confirmation Conditions
ways
Follow
Disjunctive Set
EXPERIENCE PATTERNS
Dispositional Way
Observation Sentences
Clues
causal
Order Bearers
verifiability
Intentional Meaning
implicative
patterns
Dispositional Meanings
meanings
Logical Relation
Subject Term
Meaning Situation
Observational Experience
Held
Eventual Determination
dispositional
Online AccessGet full text
ISBN9780415295963
0415295963
9780415846738
0415846730
9780415295321
0415295327
DOI10.4324/9781315822358

Cover

Table of Contents:
  • 2. Principal Varieties of Use Approaches to Meaning -- 3. Principal Achievements and Limitations of Use Approaches to Meaning -- IX Experience Patterns and Meanings -- 1. Meanings as Satisfying Major Meaning Functions -- 2. The Concept of Experience Patterns -- 3. Meanings as Experience Patterns Satisfying Major Meaning Functions -- X Experience Patterns and Varieties of Meaning -- 1. Intentional Meanings as Intended Experience Patterns -- 2. Dispositional Meanings as Experience Patterns Disposed to be Intended -- 3. Causal Meanings as Experience Patterns -- 4. Implicative Meanings as Experience Patterns -- 5. Experience Patterns and Other Factors in Meaning Situations -- Index
  • Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- I Bearers of Meaning -- 1. Undersigned Bearers of Meaning -- 2. Designed Bearers of Meaning -- 3. Changes in Bearers of Meaning and the Impact of Bearers upon Meanings -- II Ways of Meaning -- 1. The Intentional Way of Meaning -- 2. The Dispositional Way of Meaning -- 3. The Causal Way of Meaning -- 4. The Implicative Way of Meaning -- 5. Some Complexities of Ways of Meaning -- III Contexts of Meaning -- 1. Contexts of Bearers of Meaning in the Intentional Way -- 2. Contexts of Bearers of Meaning in the Dispositional Way -- 3. Contexts of Bearers of Meaning in the Causal Way -- 4. Contexts of Bearers of Meaning in the Implicative Way -- 5. Contexts of Ascriptions of Meaning -- IV Stimuli and Meanings -- 1. Some Accounts of Meaning Emphasizing Stimuli -- 2. Roles of Stimuli in Meaning Situations -- 3. The Non-Equivalence of Stimuli and Meanings -- V Responses and Meanings -- 1. Some Accounts of Meaning Emphasizing Responses -- 2. The Non-Equivalence of Responses and Meanings -- 3. Role of Responses in the Discernment of Meaning -- 4. Emotive Meaning and the Place of Emotions and Attitudes in Meaning Situations -- VI Referents and Meanings -- 1. Some Views Concerning Referents and Meanings -- 2. Reference, Bearers of Reference, and Referents -- 3. The Assimilation of Meanings to Referents -- 4. Meanings, References, and Referents -- VII Verification and Meaning -- 1. Representative Views Concerning Verifying Conditions and Meanings -- 2. Limitations and Achievements of Verifiability Criteria of Meaningfulness -- 3. Operations and Meanings -- 4. Experiential Truth Conditions and Meanings -- VIII Uses and Meanings -- 1. Some Recent Advocates of Use Approaches to Meaning