Smart markets for water resources : a manual for implementation
Why is trade in wholesale water so rare, when markets can actively trade bread, tractors, and electricity? This book shows that water markets fail because of high transaction costs, resulting in inefficient allocations and unpredictable environmental effects. To overcome these obstacles, this book p...
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| Main Authors | , |
|---|---|
| Format | Electronic eBook |
| Language | English |
| Published |
Cham, Switzerland :
Springer,
2017.
|
| Series | Global issues in water policy ;
v. 12. |
| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Full text |
| ISBN | 9783319550084 9783319550077 |
| ISSN | 2211-0631 ; |
| Physical Description | 1 online resource (xxxii, 313 pages) : illustrations (some color) |
Cover
Table of Contents:
- Foreword; Preface; Acknowledgments; Contents; List of Aside; List of Figures; List of Tables; Glossary; Chapter 1: Water Allocation: The Joint Problem of Interaction and Transaction Cost; 1.1 The Complexity of Shared Water; 1.2 The Transaction Cost of Seeking Water; 1.3 Can We Solve Water Allocation Problems by Working Better with Communities to Have Them Agree on Allocations?; 1.4 Can We Solve Water Allocation Problems with More Regulation?; 1.5 Is Infrastructure the Solution to the Problem of Water Allocation?; 1.6 Here Are the Problems with Market Approaches that Need Solving.
- 1.7 Overview of the Smart MarketReferences; Chapter 2: Water Markets: Theory and Practice; 2.1 The Problem of Hydrological Externalities; 2.1.1 What Is an Externality?; 2.1.2 The Coase Theorem; 2.1.3 The Failure of the Coase Theorem for Water Resources; 2.2 Water Allocation by Pricing Mechanisms; 2.3 Experiences with Water Markets; 2.3.1 Chile; 2.3.2 The U.S.; 2.3.3 Australia; References; Chapter 3: How Water Flows, How It Is Modeled, and How We Can Optimize It; Aside: Groundwater Terminology; 3.1 Groundwater Flow; 3.2 Hydrological Modeling; 3.3 Optimization with Linear Programming.
- Aside: A Two-User Optimization of Water Use with Linear Programming3.4 Hydrological Optimization; 3.4.1 Previous Applications; 3.4.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis; 3.4.3 Catchment Management Models; Aside: The WRAM Program; Aside: The CALVIN Program; 3.4.4 Key Ideas from Past Work on Hydrological Optimization; References; Chapter 4: Introduction to Smart Markets; 4.1 Analogies of Water Markets to Markets for Other Complex Commodities; 4.2 Electricity Smart Markets; 4.3 Natural Gas Smart Markets; 4.4 Precedents for Smart Markets for Water; 4.5 What Kind of Market Is a Smart Market for Water?
- 5.6 The Regulator Must Record and Manage Water Rights and Use5.6.1 The Regulator Must Maintain a Modern Water Rights Database; 5.6.2 The Regulator Should Redefine Initial Rights; 5.6.3 The Regulator Must Have Authority to Adjust Users Allocations; 5.6.4 The Regulator Must Enforce Users Allocation Limits; 5.7 The Regulator Must Grant Relevant Parties Full Legal Ability to Trade, with as Few Impediments as Reasonably Possible; References; Chapter 6: Participants in and Components of the Smart Market Institution; 6.1 The Water Regulator; 6.2 The Market Manager.